Grief and loss following traumatic brain injury by Herbert, Camilla
GRIEF AND LOSS FOLLOWING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
Thesis submitted for the degree 
of Doctor of Clinical Psychology 
to the Department of Psychology, 
University of Sheffield 
By 
Camilla Herbert 
MA MSc 
Chartered Clinical Psychologist 
30th January 1998 
DECLARATION 
This work has not been submitted to any other institution 
or for any other qualification. 
SUMMARY 
Literature Review: The literature review summarises the main theoretical models of 
grief and illustrates how these have developed from intra- to inter-personal models and 
from clinical to psychosocial models of bereavement. The paper explores the concepts 
of pathological, anticipatory, and disenfranchised grief, and attempts to identify aspects 
that are relevant to grief in contexts other than bereavement. Finally an attempt is made 
to integrate themes from the literature that are applicable to the experience of loss 
amongst relatives of traumatically brain-injured patients. Some useful concepts are 
identified, but there is not yet an adequate description in the literature of the 
characteristics and time course of the experience of grief in this population. 
Research Paper: - This research paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of grief 
and loss in the relatives of brain injured people. The study investigated the utility of a 
modified form of the Inventory of Complicated Grief as an appropriate measure of grief, 
and explored the hypothesis that unresolved grief was associated with poor family 
adjustment following traumatic brain injury. The study found that the Inventory of 
Complicated Grief had potential to be a useful assessment tool, with some further 
modifications, but in this small study, it was not possible to identify a component of 
grief distinct from anxiety and depression that predicted family adjustment. 
Critical Appraisal: - The process of identifying and carrying out the research study is 
discussed. The direction of the study was influenced both by clinical questions and 
practical issues. Factors that assisted the process or made it more difficult are 
described. Finally, consideration is given to the question of future research in the light 
of the experience of carrying out this particular project. 
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THE CONCEPT OF LOSS FOLLOWING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
"The spouse cannot mourn decently. Although he has lost his mate as surely and 
permanently as if by death, since the familiar body remains, society neither recognises 
the spouse's grief nor provides support and comfort that surrounds the bereaved by 
death" (Lezak 1987) 
SUMMARY 
The first part of this review summarises the main theoretical models of grief and 
illustrates how these have developed from intra- to interpersonal and from clinical to 
psychosocial models of bereavement. It offers a general critique of the research in this 
area. The second part of the paper explores the concept of pathological grief and its 
relationship to normal grief, and the concepts of anticipatory grief and disenfranchised 
grief. These concepts are examined in detail to identify aspects that are relevant to grief 
in contexts other than bereavement. The third part attempts to integrate themes from the 
literature review that are relevant to the experience of loss amongst relatives of 
traumatically brain injured patients. The normal models of grief, which are 
predominantly bereavement -focused, have little to contribute in these cases. There are 
similarities between the risk factors for pathological grief and for the pattern of 
occurrence of traumatic brain injury, but it is not clear that the concept of pathological 
grief is helpful in these cases. The difficulty of grieving whilst caring is illustrated in the 
literature concerning anticipatory grief, but the lack of a defined endpoint for relatives 
following traumatic brain injury alters the pattern of response. It is the concept of 
psychosocial death that is most directly relevant to the experience of loss amongst these 
family members, but as yet there is little research in the literature that adequately 
describes the characteristics and timecourse of this concept for this group of people. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The sense of loss experienced by relatives of brain injured individuals is different from 
normal bereavement or from sudden death in that the loved one is still present. Little is 
known about the process by which individuals or families grieve or cope with this type of 
loss. 
This paper will begin by defining the terms used in the literature to describe grief, 
mourning and bereavement. The major models of normal grief described in the literature 
are then reviewed and the methodological problems inherent in research in this area are 
discussed. Secondly, the paper will review the literature concerning pathological and 
atypical grief reactions and identify aspects that are relevant to grief in contexts other 
than bereavement, and in particular, in relation to grief in caregivers. Finally the paper 
will attempt to identify themes from the literature that are relevant to the experience of 
loss amongst relatives where they continue to provide care and support to a family 
member who has sustained a traumatic brain injury. With traumatic brain injury the 
initial damage is caused by an external event such as an assault, fall, or road traffic 
accident, as distinct from an internal event such as a stroke or brain infection. 
Definitions 
The terms bereavement, grief, and mourning are often used interchangeably. For the 
purpose of this paper bereavement is defined as the objective situation of recent loss of 
someone significant through that person's death. Grief is the emotional or affective 
response to loss. Mourning is the action(s) expressive of grief. 
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Normal grief has been the subject of an extensive literature since Freud's (1917) paper 
"Mourning and Melancholia". A brief review of the models of grief is given below. 
Although the models provide different explanations and interpretations, there is common 
agreement about the symptoms of grief (see Table 1) and that normal grief can be 
described in a number of `phases' or `stages' (variously defined in the different models, 
see Kubler Ross 1969, Bowlby 1981, Parkes 1970), beginning with numbness that may 
last for hours or days, moving through a period of yearning and protest, which alternates 
with despair, until there is recovery and restitution, although the assumption that a state 
of resolution is attained following normal grief was challenged by Wortman and Silver 
(1989). They reported evidence that suggested that for some people such a state of 
resolution is not achieved. 
The concept of pathological grief was first introduced by Freud (1917) who saw it as 
the basis of clinical depression. It includes variants such as absent grief, chronic grief 
and distorted grief. The concept has undergone a number of refinements and re- 
formulations which are discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
Atypical grief is a blanket term that has been used to cover all forms of non-normal grief, 
including pathological grief. In this paper it has been used to encompass the concepts of 
anticipatory grief, which is a term originally introduced by Lindemann (1944) and refers 
to a grief reaction that is experienced prior to an actual death, and disenfranchised grief 
which was a term used by Doka (1989) to describe the position of someone who 
experiences a sense of loss but does not have a socially recognised right, role, or capacity 
to grieve. 
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Table 1: List of Grief Symptoms 
Affective Depression 
Anxiety 
Guilt 
Anger and hostility 
Anhedonia 
Loneliness 
Behavioural manifestations Agitation 
Fatigue 
Crying 
Attitudes toward self, the deceased, Self reproach 
and the environment Low self esteem 
Helplessness, hopelessness 
Sense of unreality 
Suspiciousness 
Interpersonal problems (withdrawal from social functions) 
Attitudes toward the deceased (yearning, idealisation, 
ambivalence, preoccupation) 
Cognitive impairment Retardation of thought and concentration 
Physiological changes and bodily Loss of appetite 
complaints Sleep disturbances 
Energy loss 
Somatic complaints 
Changes in drug taking 
Susceptibility to illness and disease 
(Adapted from Stroebe & Stroebe (1987)) 
MODELS OF NORMAL GRIEF 
There is an extensive literature on models of grief which contains three broad approaches 
to understanding grief. 1) The first, and for many years most dominant, of these 
approaches followed Freud's (1917) paper which focused on grief and depression. In 
their various forms the depression models analyse grief as an emotional response to loss 
and seek to provide an understanding of many of the emotional symptoms of the grief 
reaction. Over the years the models have drawn on core themes in psychological theory 
including psychoanalytic theory, attachment theory, behavioural theory, and cognitive 
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theory and the contributions made by each of these models to our understanding of 
normal grief resolution are discussed in more detail below. 2) The second major 
approach has described grief in terms of a response to an overwhelming life event, and 
has drawn on the model of coping with stress developed by Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984). Stroebe & Stroebe (1987) in particular have developed an understanding of the 
emotional and physical consequences of partner loss by applying the general principles of 
the psychological stress model to conjugal bereavement and this is discussed below. 
3) The third approach is one that seeks to integrate the various models and to provide a 
holistic framework that encompasses different forms of loss, and to place grief and loss 
in a broader socio-cultural domain. Two such approaches, that of Schneider (see Frears 
& Schneider 1981) and Jacobs (1993) are described below. 
1. Depression models 
a) Psychoanalytic theory 
In his classic paper "Mourning and Melancholia" Freud (1917) sought to demonstrate 
that grief ('mourning') could serve as a model for clinical depression ('melancholia'). He 
described both as reactions to a loss, and that they were characterised by depressed 
mood, loss of interest, and inhibition of activities. Individuals are assumed to develop 
attachment or love toward those persons who are important for the satisfaction of their 
needs. In psychoanalytic theory love is conceptualised as the attachment (cathexis) of 
libidinal energy to the mental representation of the loved person (the object). The more 
important a person is, the greater the attachment. When a loved person is lost through 
death the survivor's libidinal energy remains attached to thoughts and memories of the 
deceased. Since the individual has only a limited pool of energy at his or her disposal, 
this attachment to the lost object has to be abandoned in order to regain the energy 
resources bound by the lost object. To sever these ties to the object requires the 
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investment of additional free energy, and the process therefore forces the grieving 
individual to turn his/her back on the real world. 
For Freud therefore the psychological function of grief is to free the individual of his or 
her ties to the deceased, achieving gradual detachment by means of reviewing the past 
and dwelling on memories of the deceased. Failure to complete this process results in 
the development of pathological grief, which Freud saw as the basis of clinical 
depression. Where no loss experience could be identified in some of his own cases of 
depression he resolved this discrepancy by suggesting that the memory of the loss may 
sometimes be repressed. He believed that the major differences between the states of 
grief and depression were the absence in healthy grief of guilt, self-reproach, and lowered 
self-esteem. 
Critique of Freud and the psychoanalytic approach to grief 
Freud's analysis has not withstood more recent work that has found that self reproach 
and low self esteem, although more typical of pathological grief, are quite frequently 
encountered in healthy grieving (Parkes 1985). Although both grief and depression may 
involve guilt, in depression guilt tends to be associated with a general sense of 
culpability, whereas in bereavement the guilt feeling is usually connected to some aspect 
of the loss itself. Symptoms characteristic of grief but not depression include the 
yearning for the deceased, imitation of his/her behaviour, preoccupation with memories 
of the deceased, and feelings of "not being here" and of "watching from the outside" 
(Stroebe and Stroebe 1987). 
Freud's work has had a major influence on subsequent theories and therapy programmes 
by his suggestion that- grief is a process to be "worked through". However, the focus of 
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this work has been primarily on the intrapersonal analysis with less emphasis on the 
effects on social interaction and cultural expectations of recovery from grief. It does not 
provide an account of the bereaved individual's need to talk to others about their loss 
and to receive condolence and social support. 
b) Attachment theory 
The theory of attachment was developed by Bowlby (1969,1973,1981) and integrates 
ideas from psychoanalysis and ethology. It provides a functional interpretation of grief, 
with an emphasis on the biological rather than the psychological function. Central to 
Bowlby's theory is the assumption that attachment behaviour has survival value for many 
species and that grief as the negative aspect of attachment is a general response to 
separation. He argued that the protest-despair sequence of phases observed in 
bereavement is a characteristic response of many species to the disruption of strong 
affectional bonds. 
One of the major functions served by an attachment object, particularly a mother, is that 
of providing a base of security from which the individual can explore the environment. 
Whenever an infant is confronted with a frightening stimulus, it not only withdraws, but 
it also retreats toward the attachment object. When the attachment object is gone, there 
is no longer any secure base to which to retreat in the presence of frightening stimuli. 
Under these conditions, being separated from one's attachment object can be terrifying, 
and according to Bowiby, this is the reason why distress is such a universal reaction to 
the separation from an attachment object. 
Attachment theory conceptualises grief as a form of separation anxiety in adulthood that 
results from the disruption of an attachment bond through loss. It offers a plausible 
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explanation for the searching behaviour, for being angry about the neglectful behaviour 
of the lost attachment figure. Although this anger and searching is dysfunctional when a 
separation is permanent it can be understood as automatic reactions to separation. 
Bowlby argued "If.. the urges to recover and scold are automatic responses built into the 
organism, it follows that they will come into action in response to any and every loss and 
without discrimination between those that are really retrievable and those, statistically 
rare, that are not" (Bowlby 1973, p. 53). 
Whether an individual reacts to loss with normal grief responses or develops a form of 
pathological grief depends, according to Bowlby (1981), on certain childhood 
experiences, in particular the pattern of parental attachment behaviour. He distinguished 
three disordered forms of attachment: anxious attachment, compulsive self-reliance, and 
compulsive care-giving. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review his theory in 
detail. However, Bowlby assumed that "pathogenic parenting" had a pervasive influence 
on an individual's later relationships, and on the way in which they reacted to the loss of 
an attachment figure. For example, adults whose childhoods were characterised by 
anxious attachments to their parents are likely to be insecurely attached to, and 
overdependent on, their marriage partners and in bereavement are liable to show a 
chronic grief reaction. There is some evidence to support this view from Parkes & Weiss 
(1983) study of a sample of Boston widows. 
Critique of attachment theory and grief 
Attachment theory offers a plausible theoretical interpretation of many aspects of normal 
and pathological grieving. It can explain the urge to search for the lost person and the 
anger at being deserted. The depressive phase of grieving can be identified as a special 
case of depression, arising as a result of the disorganisation of behaviour patterns that is 
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brought about by the loss of a significant object or goal. It allows one to identify the 
antecedents of various forms of pathological grief and also offers an explanation for the 
universality of core symptoms of grief Bowlby's theory also moved the theory of grief 
from a purely individualistic focus to an interpersonal perspective and one of the 
implications of his theory is that the impact of loss can be lessened by forming substitute 
attachments. New behaviour patterns adapted to new objects can be built up as old ones 
are broken down, and this suggests an adaptive function to the behavioural processes of 
the depression. It also offers a theoretical basis for the explanation of the role of social 
support in bereavement. 
c) Behavioural theory 
Behavioural theory, like psychoanalytic theory, has focused on depression rather than 
grief. Depression is characterised by a reduced rate of behaviour, associated with 
negative affective states. It is therefore plausible for a behavioural theorist to view 
depression as the result of a reduction in the rate of response-contingent positive 
reinforcement. 
For most people their everyday activities are closely connected with a relatively small 
number of significant others, and if one of these individuals is lost through death, then 
many of the usual responses will fail to elicit their customary rewards. This is 
particularly true for marital partners who are likely to gain a sizeable proportion of their 
rewards from activities which are mutually interdependent. It is plausible to assume that 
the extinction of a repertoire of responses which has been built up through years of 
common experience with a spouse, child or parent, will be a difficult experience. The 
analogy between bereavement and extinction does offer a plausible explanation for a 
number of symptoms which are characteristic of grief, such as the reduction of goal- 
10 
seeking behaviour, and the protest-despair response to separation and loss. However, 
the basic weakness of the behavioural theory is that it does not accommodate the role of 
cognitions. Identical changes in schedules of reinforcement should result in identical 
consequences, regardless of the reasons which led to the change. Thus in purely 
behavioural terms there should be no difference between death or absence in terms of the 
alterations to the schedule of reinforcement. It is difficult therefore to explain why 
individuals who are devastated when their partners die may have been able to cope 
successfully with extended absences of their marital partners, for example, absences 
caused by business trips or hospitalisation. In order to distinguish between the two 
situations it would be necessary to take account of the attributions made by the person 
left behind and how they interpret the meaning of the separation. 
d) Cognitive theory 
The major influence on cognitive models of depression and grief is the model of learned 
helplessness developed by Seligman and colleagues (e. g. Abramson, Seligman, & 
Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975). In this model the basic assumption is that "when an 
animal or person is faced with an outcome that is independent of his responses, he learns 
that the outcome is independent of his responses" (Seligman, 1975, p. 46). This learning 
results in motivational, cognitive, and emotional deficits. If persons or animals have 
learned that the escape from aversive stimulation occurs independent of responses, they 
will be less motivated to initiate a response, will have great difficulties in learning that 
responses can produce relief, and will react to traumatic experiences at first with fear and 
then depression. On the basis of the similarity of learned helplessness and depression 
Seligman proposed that learned helplessness and depression are parallel processes. This 
presented a number of problems as the original theory had emphasised that it was the 
uncontrollability rather than the aversiveness of the outcomes which was responsible for 
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the motivational and emotional deficits. It seemed implausible, however, that people 
would get depressed because uncontrollable good things tended to happen to them. In 
addition, it was difficult to reconcile the view that depressed individuals believe that 
outcomes occurred independently of their responses with their tendency towards self- 
blame and feeling responsible for these outcomes. 
The reformulated model (Abramson et al 1978) attempted to address some of these 
problems by changing the model from a learning into an attribution theory. In the 
reformulated version, the depressed person learns that outcomes are uncontrollable but 
this in itself is insufficient for the motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits to occur. 
For helplessness to be induced, individuals must also expect that future outcomes are 
uncontrollable. Whether current uncontrollability will lead to the expectation of future 
uncontrollability depends on the attributions an individual makes about the causes of the 
uncontrollability. The authors argue that "when a person finds that he is helpless, he asks 
why he is helpless. The causal attribution he makes then determines the generality and 
chronicity of his helplessness deficits as well as his later self-esteem" (Abramson et al., 
1978, p. 50). Abramson et al went on to suggest that these attributions could be 
classified along dimensions of personal-universal helplessness, stability, and globality. 
The reformulated model suggests that people become depressed when they believe that 
desired outcomes are unobtainable, that highly aversive events are unavoidable, and that 
they can do nothing to change this state of affairs. Whether or not they experience this 
as a blow to their self esteem will depend on whether they blame themselves for the bad 
outcome. The generality and chronicity of their depression as well as their loss of self- 
esteem will depend on the globality and stability of the factor seen as causal. The 
intensity of the motivational deficits will depend on the degree of certainty with which 
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uncontrollability is expected, while the emotional and self-esteem deficits will depend on 
the importance of the outcome. 
The learned helplessness model, particularly in its reformulated model, has clear 
implications for a theory of grief. When an individual loses a spouse through death, a 
decreased sense of outcome control is likely to be generated, which in turn will be 
accompanied by depression and cognitive disorganisation. The duration of the 
depression and whether it will be accompanied by a lowering of self-esteem, will depend 
on the surviving spouse's interpretation of the loss. In the normal course of events, 
bereaved individuals are unlikely to blame themselves for the death in a global sense and 
the loss experience should result in a feeling of universal helplessness and depression, but 
not loss of self-esteem (similar to the pattern of grieving described by Freud 1917). Not 
infrequently, however, bereaved individuals do feel some responsibility for the loss, 
sometimes irrationally, and this self-blame is typically accompanied by intense guilt 
feelings. Parkes & Brown (1972) in their study of Boston widows and widowers 
identified a number of factors which are particularly likely to induce self blame. For 
example, after a loss due to suicide or sudden and unexpected loss, or where the loss was 
associated with ambivalent marital relationships. 
Critique of the learned helplessness model 
The learned helplessness model can account for many aspects of grief, including the 
different responses to permanent and temporary loss. It can also explain why the 
presence of ambivalence in the relationship to the deceased might increase the risk of 
pathological grief reactions (Parkes & Weiss, 1983), since the ambivalence might affect 
the attributions surrounding the death event. The model struggles however to account 
for other pathological developments such as delayed grief, or absent grief. 
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2. Stress models 
Stress models view bereavement as a stressful life event, one that overtaxes the coping 
resources of an individual. The cognitive stress model of Lazarus & Folkman (1984) 
defined stress as "a particular relationship between the person and the environment that is 
appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources" (p. 19). It can be 
applied generally to all types of stress. Stroebe & Stroebe (1987) developed a model of 
partner loss which applies the stress theory specifically to bereavement. 
According to Lazarus & Folkman's (1984) model, the extent of the stress experienced in 
a given situation does not depend solely on the demands of the situation or on the 
resources of the person, but on the relationship between demands and resources. 
Lazarus distinguishes three basic forms of appraisal, primary appraisal, secondary 
appraisal, and reappraisal. In primary appraisal, individuals categorise a given situation 
with respect to its significance for their well-being, and decided whether the situation is 
irrelevant, benign-positive, or stressful. Once a situation has been categorised as 
challenging or stressful, individuals have to evaluate their coping options to decide on the 
potential for coping and to decide which strategy will be most effective in a given 
situation in achieving the intended outcome. This assessment of coping resources and 
options is referred to as secondary appraisal. The extent of stress experienced in a 
given situation is the combined result of an interaction between primary appraisal of what 
is at stake and secondary appraisal of coping options. As the original appraisal of a 
situation may change as new information about the situation or about the impact of one's 
own behaviour is received, there may need to be a reappraisal of the situation. 
When a situation has been appraised as stressful, individuals have to act to master the 
situation and/or to control their emotional reactions to the situation. These processes of 
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responding to stressful demands have been called coping processes and Lazarus & 
Folkman (1984) distinguished two basic forms of coping, problem-focused or emotion- 
focused. Problem-focused coping involves attempts by the individual to deal with stress 
by acting on the environment or the self. Emotion-focused coping involves a reappraisal 
of the stressful problem, entailing a change in the meaning of the problem. Problem- 
focused coping strategies tend to be highly variable across stressful encounters, whereas 
emotion-focused coping strategies tend to be more stable. In addition to the coping 
process, individuals draw upon their coping resources which can be personal (health, 
positive self-concept, good problem solving skills etc. ) or environmental (material 
resources, social support etc. ). 
The Deficit Model of Partner Loss (Stroebe & Stroebe 1987) applies the general 
psychological stress model to the situation of conjugal bereavement. The appraisal 
process identifies aspects of loss that are stressful, which may include the loss of 
instrumental support e. g. with household tasks or income, loss of validational support i. e. 
someone to tell you that you are doing a good job, and loss of social identity or role. 
The coping resources of the individual include personality traits, abilities, skills and 
knowledge, as well as access to financial and social support. 
Stroebe & Stroebe (1987) also distinguish between problem-oriented coping and 
emotion-oriented coping. In the bereavement literature there has been a limited amount 
of discussion of the role of emotional control strategies to reduce distress by repression 
e. g. through drinking, taking tranquillisers, or distraction. The general view of 
practitioners (e. g. Worden, 1982, Jacobs & Ostfeld, 1977) seems to be that distraction or 
repression, particularly in the early stages is unhelpful as it prevents the individual 
working through his or her grief. However, there do not seem to have been any 
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empirical studies to support this view. In spite of this lack of research there seems to be 
a general consensus among bereavement researchers (e. g. Bowlby, 1981; Freud, 1917; 
Lindemann, 1944; Parkes, 1972) that grief work is the only strategy that leads to a 
healthy resolution of the emotional reactions to loss. It is difficult to assess the validity 
of this claim since the concept of grief work has never been clearly defined. 
Critique of the stress models 
By drawing on the more general framework for the analysis of psychological stress, the 
cognitive stress model does extend beyond the focus of bereavement and depression, and 
encourage an analysis of both the intrapersonal and the interpersonal environment. By 
applying this more general model to conjugal bereavement Stroebe and Stroebe (1987) 
have developed a framework for the analysis of grief includes the demands of the 
situation that confront a person who has suffered the loss of a partner as well as the 
resources needed to cope with these demands. However, stress models focus mainly on 
the current situation of the individual, looking at whether the bereaved person has 
sufficient personal and interpersonal resources to cope with the demands. Although 
personal resources and coping processes may be influenced by past experience of loss, 
the model does not fully account for grief itself that arises from losses suffered in the 
past. 
One of the strengths of the cognitive stress approach is that the model encourages the 
identification of individuals who are at high risk of poor bereavement outcome. In 
providing this potential framework for therapeutic intervention it is similar to the 
adaptive model described by Jacobs (1993) (see below). 
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3. Schneider's model of loss and grief 
Frears & Schneider (1981) proposed a model which they argue is applicable not only to 
bereavement but different losses and different situations. Schneider (1984) claimed that 
the model was more holistic, in that it incorporated not only the biological, emotional, 
and behavioural aspects of the individual, but also the intellectual and spiritual aspects. 
It involves seven phases, from intense sadness to recovery: initial awareness, attempts to 
limit awareness, awareness of loss, gaining perspective, resolving loss, reformulating loss 
and transforming loss. Initial awareness occurs when an individual realises that he or she 
has experienced a loss. Attempts to limit awareness are a natural reaction to this initial 
awareness (e. g. "if I just work hard enough this will go away"). Awareness of loss 
occurs when one can no longer deny the significance of the loss, resulting in deep 
grieving and sadness. During this phase people fear for their own survival. The move 
towards healing occurs when one begins to gain perspective on and to accept the loss by 
examining what was lost and gained in the process. Resolving the loss requires some 
sort of restitution, a public acceptance of the loss. Reformulating the loss allows the 
grieving person to reframe his or her life in a new and expansive way. During this period 
persons are very self focused. During the final phase - transforming the loss - the person 
refocuses his or her attention on society. 
In spite of its claim to inclusivity in its definition of loss, this model continues to focus 
primarily on the intrapersonal experience of loss. It does not extend to the broader 
socio-cultural expectations of how or when to grieve. 
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4. Jacobs' Adaptive Model 
Jacobs (1993) attempts to integrate various elements from earlier models. His adaptive 
model takes into account the environmental context (e. g. social supports that influence 
an individual's response to a challenge), the nature of the loss itself, as well as the 
personal strengths and vulnerabilities of the individual. In the adaptive model the death 
of an intimate is a necessary but not sufficient cause of the clinical complications of 
bereavement. A loss, originating in the social environment and conceived of as a vector 
of potential disease, evokes grief in the survivor and, at the same time, causes a 
fundamental change in the environment. The changed environment is characterised by 
the irrevocable absence of the deceased individual and the empty situations caused by the 
loss. This view identifies a separation anxiety disorder in adults that probably occurs 
most often, but not exclusively, in the circumstances of bereavement and that probably 
has some relationship to separation anxiety disorder of childhood. By emphasising the 
social environment and the grieving tasks derived from it, such as the need to adjust to 
the status of being widowed, it partially resolves the controversy over how long grief 
endures. 
The adaptive model provides a broader view of the complex process of adjusting to loss 
than does the specific deficit model proposed by Stroebe & Stroebe (1987). It has 
similar explanatory and predictive power, but as with all these models there is little 
empirical evidence to support them. 
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Summary of the review of models of normal grief. 
The early work of Freud (1917) was important in establishing the idea that grieving 
serves an important psychological function, and in promoting the idea of grief work. 
However, the focus on the purely intrapersonal process of recovery from grief has had a 
very strong influence on subsequent analyses, and it is only more recently that broader 
multidimensional approaches have been considered. The work of Bowlby, drawing upon 
attachment theory provided a clear descriptive analysis of the yearning and searching 
behaviours characteristic of grief, and also began to include the elements of social 
interaction and need for and benefits of social support following a bereavement. 
Behavioural theory had only a limited contribution to our understanding of grief, but 
cognitive theory by incorporating attributional theory has provided a model that can 
explain the difference in psychological terms between separation and death, and which 
can incorporate the effect of ambivalent relationships in predicting some forms of 
pathological grief reactions. More helpful in terms of providing a framework that can 
guide therapeutic interventions is the analysis in terms of adjustment to a stressful life 
events, since this draws together the assessment of both the intrapersonal resources and 
the situational demands. Models such as that of Frears and Schneider (1981) and Jacobs 
(1993) have attempted to integrate these functional analyses of the coping process with 
the intrapsychic processes described in the depression-models. 
The major difficulty in this field is that so few of the models have been subjected to 
rigorous empirical evaluation. The following section will examine difficulties in research 
in this field. 
19 
Critique of Methodological Issues in Grief Research 
1. Measurement of Grief 
In spite of the considerable body of work devoted to conceptualising and measuring the 
experience of bereavement, there is still no standard approach to bereavement 
assessment, in either the clinical or research settings. The validity of measures of 
grieving is unproven. So many variables seem to be involved, such as cognitive, 
emotional, physiological states, and to vary in importance over time. The ability of the 
measures to discriminate grief from other related constructs such as depression, physical 
health, or mood state, has not been demonstrated. Little attention has been paid to 
extending the scope of the measures beyond the individual to the affected family system, 
whose grief reaction may be interdependent. 
2. Research Design Issues 
Although bereavement is a universal phenomenon it is not straightforward to design a 
study to investigate it. Identifying and accessing a bereaved population can be difficult. 
The enormous number of factors thought to influence the grieving process need to be 
considered, including the age and gender of the griever, the psychological well-being of 
the griever prior to the bereavement, the nature of the loss (e. g. sudden, traumatic, or 
predicted), the extent of social support etc. It is difficult also to control for variables 
such as tranquilliser use or use of alcohol. Large scale studies that may measure only a 
limited number of variables have to be compared with smaller studies that can provide 
greater depth in assessment and analysis but which may have only limited generalisability 
to other groupings of bereaved individuals. 
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There are problems with defining normal and pathological grief Although the symptoms 
of normal grief have been extensively described in the literature, the range of individual 
variation in responses is also apparent. Finally, there are socio-cultural expectations 
about appropriate grief reactions that can influence the way in which a griever responds 
to a researcher. The difficulties inherent in conducting research in such a sensitive area 
with so many variables to consider may explain why grief models have been subjected to 
limited empirical evaluation. 
There have been more recent longitudinal in-depth studies with well-controlled designs 
that controlled for potential biasing factors in sampling, or social desirability bias of 
responses. For example, McCrae & Costa (1993) used a longitudinal data set with a 
large sample to examine the course of recovery among the bereaved. They were able to 
measure the long-term effects of widowhood by comparing a pre- and post-event 
assessment of certain key variables, in a repeated measures analysis that controlled for 
initial differences between groups on key biographical variables. They were also able to 
avoid bereavement "priming", as respondents were not aware that widowhood was a 
variable of interest. However, most longitudinal studies suffer from high subject attrition 
rates, and have made only limited use of control groups. 
There is also a tendency throughout the literature to make unjustified inferences of 
causality. For example, it is claimed that social support helps the bereaved get over loss 
on the basis of the finding that the better adjusted have higher levels of social support 
than the worse off. This is not necessarily a valid inference, since there may be other 
factors that jointly affect health outcome and the provision of support. Stylianos & 
Vachon (1993) explored the interaction of personality and social support and found that 
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certain personality types are associated with better coping styles and are easier to 
provide with social support. 
PATHOLOGICAL AND ATYPICAL GRIEF REACTIONS 
This section of the paper will examine pathological and atypical grief reactions and 
identify aspects of grief that are relevant in contexts other than bereavement. First it will 
consider the concept of pathological grief and what this contributes to our understanding 
of the grieving process. Secondly it will focus on grief in the context of caregiving and 
the concept of anticipatory grieving for the terminally ill. Finally it will explore the 
concept of disenfranchised grief, in particular the notion of psychosocial death where the 
death is not recognised but the griever nevertheless experiences a sense of loss. 
1. Pathological Grief 
The term pathological grief was first used by Freud, in reference to the depressive 
symptoms he felt were characteristic of melancholia rather than mourning. Deutsch 
(1937) first suggested that absent grief was a variant of pathological grief. Lindemann 
(1944) subsequently introduced a typology of morbid grief reactions that extended 
beyond depressive symptoms (Freud's `melancholia') and absent grief. He proposed that 
`delayed grief was a major variation of morbid grief, and in addition he itemised nine 
clinical presentations of `distorted grief which if untreated would become unresolved, 
prolonged grief. 
Bowlby (1981) identified two main variants of disordered mourning as chronic 
mourning, including severe and prolonged emotional response, and absent grief, which 
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described a pattern of persistent anger and self-reproach associated with depression in 
the prolonged absence of conscious sorrow. This formulation was based in his cognitive 
theory of attachment discussed earlier in which the patterns established in childhood 
influenced later relationships and responses to loss, including bereavement. 
Parkes (1965) based his formulation of pathological grief on his direct observational 
studies and classified pathologic bereavement reactions as inhibited grief, delayed grief, 
and chronic grief. This typology provided the cornerstone of more recent attempts to 
develop descriptive criteria for the diagnosis of pathologic grief. 
Subsequently Parkes and Weiss (1983) developed another typology that acknowledged 
the potential effects of the manner of the death and characteristics of the relationship to 
the deceased individual as part of the clinical syndrome. This included unanticipated 
grief, conflicted grief (described as similar to delayed or absent grief and thought to 
occur when the relationship was ambivalent) and chronic grief. 
There have been some detailed and systematic studies of grief symptoms that have 
identified complications in the normal bereavement process. For example, Bornstein et 
al (1973) found that although 45% of acutely bereaved spouses developed depressive 
syndromes during the first year of bereavement that were transient and subsided 
spontaneously, 17% of the sample remained depressed throughout the whole first year of 
bereavement. Other studies have documented a risk of anxiety disorders during acute 
bereavement (Jacobs 1987; Jacobs et al 1990). What remains unclear is the relationship 
between normal mourning, depressive illness including anxiety disorders, and 
pathological grief There is considerable overlap between the syndrome of pathological 
grief and other psychiatric syndromes, such as major depression and anxiety disorders. 
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There have been very few studies examining this area and those that have been published 
(e. g. Kim & Jacobs 1991) have been retrospective and based on small numbers of 
patients. Pathological variants of grief do not differ qualitatively from normal grief (with 
the exception of the syndrome of absent grief). In most instances the criteria for 
pathological grief are set in reference to the normal progression of grief (emotional 
numbing and disbelief, separation distress, mourning-depression, where these phases 
overlap but evolve over time). There are no empirical studies of the criteria for the 
diagnosis of pathological grief and no definitive consensus by clinicians 
In spite of this lack of conceptual clarity the idea of a state of pathological grief has an 
intuitive appeal and has been recognised throughout history and described in art and 
literature. 
2. Anticipatory Grief 
Anticipatory grief is a term originally introduced by Lindemann (1944) and is applicable 
to all chronic illness. Some studies have shown that the opportunity to engage in 
anticipatory grief resulted in better adjustment to bereavement (Futterman, Hoffman & 
Sabshin, 1972; Parkes & Weiss, 1983; Vachon et al., 1982), suggesting that the warning 
of a death may give people time to prepare for the inevitable. Other studies have found 
that there was no relationship between the length of the anticipatory grief period and 
adjustment following the death (Maddison & Viola, 1968; Parkes, 1970). It is important 
to distinguish between forewarning of loss and anticipatory grieving. Individuals may be 
aware of the impending loss but not grieve in anticipation (Clayton et al, 1973). In part 
this may explain the somewhat contradictory findings about the value of having advanced 
warning, as not all studies have made this distinction. 
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The concept of anticipatory grief has survived, partly because Rando (1986) expanded 
the concept to include grief over past and current, as well as future losses. Although 
most studies have focused on the terminally ill, where the anticipated loss is imminent 
and certain, the concept has also been applied to the challenges faced by families of 
people with chronic illnesses such as Alzheimer's Disease or other dementias. The 
changes in the early stages of dementia may be gradual, but as the nature and extent of 
the changes and their implications become clear family members may start to prepare for 
a future without the loved one. Providing increasingly demanding care, while 
simultaneously managing their own grief, places additional demands on an already 
overloaded caregiver (Parks & Pilisuk, 1991). Some authors have discussed the 
expectation that the demands of caregiving impede the anticipatory grief process. For 
example Marples (1986) stated that "family members cannot properly mourn the loss of 
the person they once knew; they are too preoccupied with the activities necessary for 
providing care" (p. 492). 
Some authors have utilised what amounts to "stages" of grief when describing the 
response of caregivers to the diagnosis and ongoing care of an impaired family member. 
Cohen, Kennedy, and Eisdorfer (1984) suggested that during the terminal phase of the 
disease families experience a degree of "maturation" where caregivers accept a patient as 
being very different and as never returning to the earlier status of the person they knew 
and loved. Cole, Griffin, and Ruiz (1986) acknowledged that although the family may 
mourn the loss of their loved one, especially during the latter stages of Alzheimer's 
Disease, the fact that the patient is still living complicates the situation, and they suggest 
the family may need permission to grieve the loss of a relationship that no longer exists. 
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Much of the literature on anticipatory grief and caregivers of persons with Alzheimer's 
Disease and other dementia is largely suggestive and anecdotal. However, Ponder and 
Pomeroy (1996) systematically investigated the grief behaviours of 100 caregivers of 
person with dementia providing an average of just over forty hours of care each week to 
a patient who had received a medical diagnosis of Alzheimer's Disease or other dementia 
an average of almost three years earlier. They developed the Stage of Grief Inventory 
(SGI) to identify the extent to which caregivers expressed feelings and attitudes 
characteristic of five stages of anticipatory grief (denial, over-involvement, anger, guilt, 
and acceptance). They also adapted questions from the Parental Experience Assessment 
Form (PEAF; see Rando 1983) to identify the number of anticipatory grief behaviours 
the caregiver reported they had engaged in during the prior two months (e. g. discussing 
with someone the possibility that the care recipient would die; thinking what the future 
would be like without the care recipient), and questions from the Anticipatory Grief 
Inventory (Levy, 1991). Finally, they used the Despair Scale of the non-death loss 
version of the Grief Experience Inventory (Sanders, Mauger, & Strong, 1985). They 
found that the caregivers were simultaneously experiencing varied and even 
contradictory feelings. They describe a pattern of grief intensity and grief behaviour, 
whereby caregivers in the early stages of grief are either unable to acknowledge the 
losses that are occurring or are concentrating their efforts on forestalling the ravages of 
the illness. During the denial stage, caregivers may fail to recognise the importance of 
even gross deterioration of their loved one's cognitive functioning. Denial is often 
followed by "over involvement" which is characterised by an exaggerated concentration 
of the care recipient's needs at the expense of the caregiver's physical health and 
interpersonal relationships. Both the intensity of grief and the number of grief 
behaviours increased during the middle stages of grief. The ability of the caregiver to 
acknowledge anger towards the illness, the care recipient, health care professional, or 
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other family members, and their own inability to perform to their expectations signified 
their acknowledgement of the devastation brought about by the illness. Finally, both the 
intensity and number of grief behaviours declined as the caregiver reached acceptance. 
The authors report that the majority of the sample (73%) scored most highly on the 
acceptance subscale of the SGI but go on to describe the impression of the researcher 
conducting the interviews who felt that caregivers in other stages were under identified 
due to the lack of sensitivity of the instrument used and the social desirability inherent in 
personal interviews. This highlights two of the major problems with bereavement 
research as noted earlier in the general critique of methodological issues. There are a 
growing number of measures being adapted in a variety of ways to meet the demands of 
specific populations or studies. The measures may prove to be insufficiently sensitive as 
in this study, and few studies are able to avoid the problems with social desirability bias. 
3. Disenfranchised Grief 
Where a person experiences a sense of loss but does not have a socially recognised right, 
role, or capacity to grieve, their grief is disenfranchised. The person suffers a loss but 
has little or no opportunity to mourn publicly (Doka 1989). The concept has been used 
to describe unique problems in grieving among different populations such as peri- 
/prenatal death (Raphael 1983), ex-spouses (Doka 1986), and pet loss (Kay et al., 1984). 
Other groups include families of Alzheimer's patients (Doka 1985) and adults with 
learning disabilities (Lipe-Goodson & Goebel, 1983; Edgerton, Bollinger, & Herr 1984) 
The concept of disenfranchised grief recognises that societies have sets of norms or 
grieving rules that attempt to specify who, when, where, how, how long, and for whom 
people should grieve. These rules may be explicit, for example, codified in personnel 
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policies (e. g. a week off for the death of a spouse or child, three days for the loss of a 
parent or sibling) or implicit. In any given society these grieving rules may not 
correspond to the nature of attachments, the sense of loss or the feelings of survivors. 
Doka (1989) argued that there are three main reasons why people may be excluded from 
the normal grieving process. 
a) The relationship itself is not recognised 
In general society recognises kin-based relationships. The underlying assumption is 
made that closeness of relationship exists only among spouses and/or immediate kin 
(Folka and Deck 1976). Although relationships with stepchildren, caregivers, 
colleagues, roommates (e. g. in nursing homes) may be long-lasting and are recognised, 
mourners may be expected to support and assist family members rather than grieve 
publicly themselves. Other non-traditional relationships such as extramarital affairs or 
homosexual relationships have tenuous public acceptance and limited legal standing and 
grief at the death of a partner may not be acknowledged or socially supported. Ex- 
spouses or former friends may have limited contact but the death of the significant other 
can still cause a grief reaction because it brings finality to the earlier loss, ending any 
remaining contact or fantasy of reconciliation or reinvolvement. These feelings may also 
be shared by others in their world such as parents or children mourning the loss of "what 
might have been" or "what once was" (Doka, 1989). 
b) The griever is not recognised 
Here the person is not socially defined as capable of grief, therefore there is little or no 
social recognition of his or her sense of loss or need to mourn. It is the personal 
characteristics of the bereaved that in effect disenfranchise their grief. The very old and 
the very young are typically perceived by others as having little comprehension of or 
reaction to the death of a significant other. Similarly, mentally disabled persons may also 
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be disenfranchised in grief (Lipe-Goodson & Goebel, 1983; Edgerton, Bollinger, & Herr 
1984). 
c) The loss is not recognised 
Some losses are not socially defined as significant. Perinatal death for example is still 
regarded by many as a relatively minor loss in spite of a rapidly growing literature 
detailing the strength of the grief reaction experienced by many women (Raphael 1983). 
Abortion too can create a sense of loss that is hidden and confounded by the additional 
conflicts surrounding personal beliefs about the sanctity of life. Another loss that is often 
not perceived as significant is the loss of a pet. Nevertheless research does show strong 
ties between pets and humans and profound reactions to loss (Kay et al 1984). 
Of more direct relevance to the traumatic brain injured population are losses resulting 
from what Sudnow (1967) describes as "social death". Sudnow defined social death as 
being when "relevant attributes of the person begin permanently to cease to be operative 
as conditions for treating him" e. g. a person who is comatose or a highly disoriented and 
institutionalised Alzheimer's patient". Here the person is alive but treated as if dead. 
The main carer often cannot move on with their own life. Kalish (1966) added that 
perceptions of social death occur on a continuum: "A given person may be socially dead 
to one individual, to many individuals, or to virtually everyone". 
"Psychosocial death" is a term that has been used when the persona of someone has 
changed so significantly, through mental illness, organic brain syndromes, or even 
significant personal transformation (e. g. through addiction, conversion) that significant 
others perceive the person as he or she previously existed as dead. In all these cases 
spouses and others may experience a profound sense of loss, but that loss cannot be 
publicly acknowledged for the person is still biologically alive. 
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Mental illness, chronic brain disorders such as Alzheimer's disease, substance abuse, and 
of course, traumatic brain injury, can have a significant impact on the personality of an 
individual and can radically affect the lives of others around him or her. All relationships 
change over time as people grow and develop. Not all changes create problems, the 
differentiation being between sudden/dramatic changes in a relationship and the normal 
incremental changes over time. In some situations the changes in one party or dissimilar 
changes in both may lead to the dissolution of the relationship - "we've grown apart". 
However when change is dramatic, and particularly when it is not perceived as 
intentional or as under the control of the person, options like divorce or separation may 
be effectively precluded. 
It has long been recognised that relatives of people with Alzheimer's often experience 
deep feelings of loss. Cole, Griffin and Ruiz (1986) reviewed the issues that arise for 
families as they cope with caring for someone with a chronic degenerative condition. 
They note that "family members may also feel a profound sense of loss, as a loved one 
who was once a vital person gradually loses mental, physical and social abilities". The 
qualities of the person to whom one was attached are no longer present. As one spouse 
of an Alzheimer's victim said "All you have is a shell mocking what once was. " The 
person is psychologically dead. 
There has been work done in exploring the effects of psychosocial death in relation to 
Alzheimer's Disease (Wasow 1986, Liptzin, Grob and Eisen 1988, Quayhagen and 
Quayhagen 1988). One of the most pervasive reactions is guilt, either because of a belief 
that the relative could or should have responded to symptoms earlier that might have 
delayed or prevented subsequent difficulties, or because the relative feels that it was their 
own inability to be an effective parent or good spouse that contributed to the problem. 
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In addition to guilt about causation, there is often guilt about the ways in which the 
relatives are coping - where the condition is perceived as beyond the control of the 
victim the relative may feel it is inappropriate to respond angrily or to get irritated. The 
relative may also feel guilty about their own negative feelings toward the victim. 
Although the intensity and nature of grief reactions to psychosocial losses are affected by 
all the same variables that affect any response to loss (such as the nature of the 
relationship, family and social support, and circumstances surrounding loss), Doka 
(1989) argues that two variables are unique to this form of loss, firstly, the extent to 
which knowledge of the level of disability or change in the person is shared and/or 
perceived by others, and secondly, the extent to which the underlying condition causing 
psychosocial death can be viewed along a continuum of reversibility to irreversibility. 
With irreversible conditions, the loss is certain, and although that knowledge may be 
resisted by defence mechanisms such as denial, there will often be a sense of 
hopelessness. The irreversibility of the loss may create high levels of ambivalence and 
subsequent guilt as one copes with the daily tasks of life. There may be deep, guilt 
provoking desires for the victim's institutionalisation or even death. 
In situations that are perceived as reversible, there may also be increased impatience with 
the slow pace of recovery and intensified feeling of anger toward a victim who is 
perceived still to have some sense of control. Liptzin, Grob and Eisen (1988) found that 
over time relatives of depressed patients felt more burden than did relatives of dementia 
patients, since the latter often grew to accept the fact that the relative's decline was 
inevitable, irreversible, and thus beyond their control. Bennett and Bennett (1984) noted 
that hopelessness can help families experience less blame and measure accomplishments 
in terms of endurance and adaptation rather than cure. 
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The problem of disenfranchised grief lies in the paradox that the very nature of this type 
of grief exacerbates the problems of grief, whilst at the same time removing or 
minimising the usual sources of support. Disenfranchising grief can intensify the feelings 
of anger, guilt, or powerlessness that can form part of the normal grief experience. In 
addition, both ambivalent relationships and concurrent crises have been identified in the 
literature as conditions that complicate grief (Worden 1982, Raphael 1983, Rando 
1984). 
UNDERSTANDING GRIEF AND LOSS FOR RELATIVES 
IN RELATION TO TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
This section of the paper will briefly review the relevance of models of normal grief in 
understanding the nature of the loss and grief experienced after traumatic brain injury. It 
will then consider the similarities between the risk factors for traumatic brain injury and 
for pathological grief. Finally it will explore aspects of psychosocial loss and the effects 
on caregivers of anticipatory grief in relation to the experiences of relatives of 
traumatically injured people. 
The models of normal grief are not particularly helpful in understanding the sense of loss 
after traumatic brain injury as they focus primarily on bereavement. In particular the 
depression models, with their primary focus on the intrapersonal analysis, are inadequate 
to account for the complex set of demands and expectations placed on families after 
traumatic brain injury. The continued presence of the individual makes it difficult to go 
through the process of severing existing ties, as required both by psychoanalytic theory 
and attachment theory. Behavioural theory cannot explain the changes in the face of the 
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continued presence of the injured relative who may continue to exhibit many of the same 
behaviours. The life-stress models provide a framework for analysing the resources 
available to family members, and potentially of identifying who will need additional 
support. It is interesting to note that for many years support for families following 
traumatic brain injury has focused on the emotional coping process, particularly during 
the early stages. More recently there has been greater attention to the longer term 
support needs of family members and here the literature has described problem-focused 
approaches (Jacobs 1991). Others have argued that until the emotional task of grieving 
has begun the family cannot take steps to reorganise themselves (Perlesz & Mclachlan 
1986). From work with people experiencing chronic stress over which they have no 
control comes evidence that suggests that under such conditions, problem-focused 
coping can be counter productive and emotion focused coping more likely to produce 
better outcomes (Collins, Baum, & Singer 1983). There is scope here for further work 
to understand the most appropriate timing and nature of any interventions. 
Many of the defining characteristics of traumatic brain injury establish the risk factors for 
pathological or abnormal grief responses. It is by definition a sudden, traumatic, and 
unanticipated event. There is usually an element of liability to be established, which may 
result in blame being attached to the injured person, the relative directly (e. g. if they were 
driving the car but were unhurt), or indirectly (e. g. where the relative blames themselves 
for not preventing the accident), or to a third person who may or may not be criminally 
liable. In addition, more than two thirds of those who sustain traumatic brain injury are 
aged under 30 years and the ratio of males to females is approximately 2: 1 (Jennett & 
MacMillan 1981). Thus in terms of vulnerability factors outlined in the literature, 
traumatic brain injury affects a young predominantly male population, and the grievers 
are predominantly parents and partners. The nature of the loss is sudden and 
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unpredicted, and the cause of the injury may give rise to conflicting emotions of guilt and 
anger. Although there are obvious parallels in terms of vulnerability factors, there is no 
systematic descriptive data on the development of normal or pathological grief in the 
relatives of people who have sustained traumatic brain injury. 
There is, nevertheless, widespread recognition that family members may go through a 
process of grieving for the losses that result from the head injury. In some cases the 
family members report that the fundamental aspects of the injured person's personality 
have changed such that the person they knew and loved is "dead". Since the recovery 
process is an uncertain one with extended periods of hope and despair, feelings about the 
changes may remain in turmoil for many months or years. This uncertainty and the 
concomitant disorganisation of the grieving process have resulted in the development of 
the term "mobile mourning" (Muir et al 1990). The experience of grieving can be put 
off, sometimes indefinitely, which has been termed "grieving in abeyance" (Perlesz and 
McLachlan 1986). There are parallels here with the concept of "delayed grief' as a 
pathological outcome following normal bereavement, and also with the concept of 
psychosocial death. in that the injured person is present and the sense of loss is not 
acknowledged. The need to provide care and support whilst living with the sense of loss 
has some similarities with the phenomenon of anticipatory grief, although the comparison 
is limited as there is no natural endpoint following traumatic brain injury. 
Resolution of grief associated with psychosocial death may be difficult to achieve. 
Worden (1982) suggested that four tasks are necessary before grief can be resolved: 
accepting the reality of death, experiencing the pain of grief, adjusting to a life without 
the deceased, and withdrawing emotional energy from the deceased and reinvesting it in 
others. Following traumatic brain injury this may involve the prolonged process of 
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recognising the nature and extent of the personality change and experiencing fully the 
sense of loss, and here there is a parallel with the difference between anticipatory grief 
and forewarning of loss. Many family members may describe changes without 
acknowledging the losses these changes entail. The physical appearance and many of the 
mannerisms may stay the same, giving the illusion that nothing has changed and 
contributing to a situation in which the bereaved may continue to deny the reality of the 
loss. The emotional catharsis first described by Freud (1917) and which forms the core 
of most grief work involves a review of the relationship and a resolution of the feelings 
inherent in such a review. Although theoretically possible, social expectations and 
practical constraints mean that such a process is rarely observed in clinical practice 
following psychosocial loss. 
The literature on anticipatory grief also suggests that the burden of caring may prevent 
or inhibit this process of review. Apart from the practical problem of lack of time when 
the griever is also a carer, there is no space for emotional detachment. The demands of 
time spent caring, supervising the individual, or in taking on roles that the injured person 
can no longer fulfil is likely to increase. Instead of becoming more detached the 
relationship will also develop in what are often less positive ways, involving as it does the 
growing demands of care, and the changed and often bizarre behaviour of the person 
which causes new stress, shame, guilt, anger, and helplessness. At a time when they 
need support from family or society, the changed behaviour of the person may result in 
increasing isolation. Societal and family pressures can make it difficult to withdraw from 
the situation either practically or emotionally let alone invest in a new relationship. 
There may be conflicting pressures where a partner has to consider the needs of the 
injured adult against the needs of dependent children. The spouse may become what 
Grossman and Grossman (1983) called a pseudowidow or a cryptowidow; he or she 
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remains legally, but not behaviourally, married. As Lezak (1987) said in the quotation 
given at the beginning of this paper: "The spouse cannot mourn decently. Although he 
has lost his mate as surely and permanently as if by death, since the familiar body 
remains, society neither recognises the spouse's grief nor provides support and comfort 
that surrounds the bereaved by death". 
Very little is known about the effects on carers who decide to leave the situation. The 
divorce rate after traumatic brain injury is high and there is some evidence to suggest that 
parents provide care for longer than spouses. In spite of the parallels with elderly carers 
and their relatives with dementia, the main difference with the traumatic brain injured 
patients may lie in the relative youth of the population. Most people who sustain 
traumatic brain injury are aged between 18 and 30 years old and have a near normal life 
expectancy. There is evidence of the long-term burden on carers who remain in contact 
(Livingstone & Brooks 1988) but little information other than anecdotal on those who 
move on. For those who remain it is unclear if they have achieved some form of a partial 
resolution of feelings that allows them to maintain emotional equilibrium, recognising the 
losses experienced while continuing to give care. It is also unclear whether this is what 
constitutes `adaptation' after brain injury, and if so whether it is a stable state or whether 
the grieving process is held in a state of partial suspension or abeyance. Further work on 
the process of family adaptation and the factors influencing it is required. The main 
research study seeks to contribute to this body of knowledge. 
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THE ROLE OF GRIEF IN FAMILY ADAPTATION FOLLOWING 
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 
45 
ABSTRACT 
Previous research has shown that family members experience psychological distress and 
an increased caregiver burden following traumatic brain injury (Livingston & Brooks 
1988). Relatively little research to date has considered the extent to which family 
members recognise and grieve for the loss of the person they used to know. This 
preliminary study examined the utility of a modified version of the Inventory of 
Complicated Grief (Prigerson et al 1995) as a measure of grief in 34 relatives of people 
who had sustained a traumatic brain injury at least 12 months previously, and the role of 
complicated grief in predicting family adjustment (Family Assessment Device, Epstein et 
al 1983). Severity of injury and socio-demographic factors were not predictive of family 
adjustment. High levels of anxiety and depression (Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale, Snaith & Zigmond 1983) were identified in relatives up to four years post injury. 
In this small study it was not possible to identify a component of grief distinct from 
anxiety and depression that predicted adjustment. However, the assessment tool was 
comprehensible and acceptable to relatives and with further modification may provide a 
useful measure to test the hypothesis that unresolved grief prevents successful family 
adjustment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most studies suggest that around 70% of traumatic brain injuries result from road traffic 
accidents. Other causes include cycling accidents, assaults, falls and sports injuries. It is 
difficult to obtain precise data regarding the incidence of traumatic brain injury, due to 
variations in definition and methods of data collection. Jennett and MacMillan (1981) 
cited estimates of the incidence of hospitalisation following head injury in Britain and the 
United States as between 200 and 300 per 100,000 of the population. They estimated 
that around one in five of those admitted to hospital had sustained moderate or severe 
head injuries. Many of those who sustain mild head injuries can suffer ongoing cognitive 
difficulties (Levin et al 1987a). 
Males are more likely than females to sustain traumatic brain injury, with figures varying 
between ratios of two and three to one. More than two-thirds of those who sustain 
traumatic brain injury are aged under 30 years, the majority occurring in those 15-24 
years of age (Jennett & MacMillan 1981). Studies focusing on other characteristics of 
the traumatic brain injured population suggest that a greater than average proportion 
have a history of psychopathology, substance abuse, particularly heavy alcohol 
consumption, and poor academic performance (Bond, 1984; Haas, Cope, & Hall, 1987; 
Rimel & Jane, 1984). Traumatic brain injury has also been shown to occur more 
commonly in the lower socio-economic classes and amongst those who are unemployed 
(Rimel & Jane, 1984). Improvements in acute care have resulted in reduced mortality 
rates in recent years. This, together with the relative youth of those who sustain 
traumatic brain injury, has led to a rapid growth in the number of survivors of traumatic 
brain injury in the community. The vast majority of these survivors return to living with 
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family members who are often ill equipped to respond to the changes in life style and 
caregiver burden imposed by the injury and its sequelae (Diehl 1983; Sbordone 1988). 
The concept of `burden' is as difficult to define as it is to measure. It involves a 
multiplicity of social, emotional and physical effects that the injury has on the caregiver, 
as well as on the perceptions of the caregiver and his or her capacity to cope. In 
addition, the concept of burden has to reflect the nature of the interaction between the 
injured person, the caregiver, and other family members. Most studies have made an 
operational decision to define burden e. g. as the psychosocial functioning of the 
caregiver. Following the model established in studies of family burden after discharge of 
long-stay psychiatric inpatients to the community (Grad & Sainsbury 1968) burden has 
been viewed as relatives' complaints (subjective burden) and/or the measurable effect of 
burden on the relative (objective burden). In practice this distinction becomes blurred, 
and most studies that attempt to assess objective burden appear in fact to measure 
relatives' perceptions of their burden, rather than objective change. Measures of 
caregiver psychological distress have often consisted of single questions or visual 
analogue scales, or questionnaires of unknown reliability and ambiguous meaning. The 
relationship between `burden', `strain' and `psychological distress' (such as anxiety and 
depression) is usually unspecified. 
Livingston & Brooks (1988) reviewed the literature on burden in families following 
traumatic brain injury. They found that the broad range of populations studied and 
problems with methodology made comparison between studies of family burden difficult. 
Livingston et al (1985a) reported high levels of distress that develop rapidly during the 
first three months post injury and persist for one, five and seven years post injury 
(Livingston et al 1985b, Brooks et al 1986, Brooks et al 1987). Rosenbaum & Najenson 
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(1976), studying a military population, found a high level of depression and irritability in 
the wives of head injury victims compared with partners of paraplegic patients and staff 
wives. This pattern was not found by Oddy et al (1978) at six months post injury, who 
found more family disturbance in single patients living with parents compared with 
married patients living with a spouse. Livingston et al (1985b) also looked at social 
adjustment and found that by six months post injury the relatives of the severely injured 
patients were beginning to show evidence of social malfunctioning and that this poorer 
functioning persisted at twelve months post injury. They argued that deterioration in the 
social functioning of relatives is slower to evolve than mood disturbance as decisions 
about whether to give up work or spend more time at home are often delayed for a time. 
Several studies have looked at relatives' complaints about the patient's problems 
following head injury (Brooks et al 1986; Brooks et al 1987; Rosenbaum & Najenson 
1976; Oddy et al 1978). Most relatives are concerned about tiredness, impatience, loss 
of temper, apathy, aggression, and lability of mood, together with more cognitive 
complaints of slowness of thinking and memory difficulties. 
Some studies have used homogenous samples of only mild or only severe injuries, and 
subsequent measures of the patients' difficulties are often in the form of self report 
ratings by the patient or the caregiver rather than objective clinical rating systems or 
neuropsychological assessment. However, in spite of these reservations about 
comparability, the studies are consistent in highlighting a high incidence of mood 
disturbance in the relatives of the brain injured. Common sense suggests that patient 
descriptors, such as severity of injury or residual cognitive deficits, should be related to 
caregiver psychological distress, but empirical research has failed to find consistent 
patterns of association between the patients' level of disability and caregiver's 
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psychological distress. Livingston et al (1987) found that the major intrapersonal 
determinant of psychosocial adjustment for relatives was their previous psychiatric and 
physical health record. In their previous study (Livingston et al 1985b) they found that 
the major factor predicting relatives' psychosocial distress was the subjective complaints 
voiced by the patients. Age, social class, relationship to the patient, work experience, 
and medication were not strong predictors of relatives' distress. 
Based on the model of depression outlined by Brown et al (1977), Livingston & Brooks 
(1988) suggested that relatives may be `sensitised' by previous illness experience 
themselves and that the symptoms of the head injured person create stresses that provoke 
maladaptive coping strategies. More recently Kreutzer et al (1994a) compared the 
adaptation of families after traumatic brain injury with more general psychological 
models of stress and specifically models of coping with chronic illness such as 
Alzheimer's Disease (Vitaliano et al 1991). In this conceptualisation the problems 
experienced by the families with a chronically ill member are related more to their own 
resources, coping styles and organisation than to the injured person's limitations. 
Moore et al (1989,1991,1993) published a series of studies examining the relationship 
between individual coping and system coping in individuals and families with TBI. They 
found that family coping and marital resources were overwhelmed by TBI, so that coping 
had only a minor role in eventual outcome. External circumstances, such as improved 
childcare, patient care services and increased social support seemed to be overriding 
factors in predicting outcome. 
Leaf (1993) collected data from more than 75 families over a three year period asking 
the families what elements helped them cope and adjust to the tragedy. The range of 
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time post injury extended from 3 months to 25 years post injury. From 0 to 1.5 years 
families cited faith, family and friends, and services. From about 1.5 years onwards the 
main coping supports were family and friends, professional support and the availability of 
services, and information and education. The trend was such that the longer the period 
since the injury the more value families placed on understanding the nature of the deficits 
and becoming able to deal with changes in memory, behaviour and personality. 
Researchers have attempted to measure the burden of family members as a function of 
traumatic brain injury using measurement scales developed in family system work. Frank 
et al (1990) found that individuals with traumatic brain injury relied extensively upon 
information seeking strategies as a way of coping, and families emphasised family 
cohesion as a way of coping. The increased passivity and dependency often reported 
following TBI required families to be more cohesive to manage the dependency. 
Kreutzer et al (1994a) extended the evaluation of individual psychological 
symptomatology and family functioning. He found that nearly half the caregivers of their 
sample of mild, moderate and severely injured individuals met the criteria for psychiatric 
"caseness" when measured between 1.5 months to 5 years post injury. Using the Family 
Assessment Device (Epstein et al 1983) to measure healthy family functioning, they 
found problems in a number of dimensions including family communication, affective 
involvement and roles. Spouses of individuals with brain injury were found to have less 
optimal adjustment than parents. Douglas & Spellacy (1996) found that the strongest 
predictor of long term family functioning was given by caregivers' self report of 
depression, social support, and coping together with the caregivers' perceptions of 
patient competency. 
51 
Over the past three decades increased knowledge of the effects of traumatic brain injury 
on survivors and their families has given rise to increased appreciation of its complexity. 
Research has looked at injury related factors, psychopathology of both the injured person 
and the relatives, stress and coping theory, and more recently models of loss and grief. 
There has been a recognition that family members may go through a process of grieving 
for the losses that result from the brain injury, although this process may be incomplete. 
Romano (1974) observed the responses of families and found relatively little progress 
beyond the initial stage of denial. Families had a strong tendency to maintain the fantasy 
that the patient would "wake up" and return to his or her previous level of functioning. 
Relatives would often deny or minimise the patient's disabilities and hold unreasonable 
expectations regarding the patient's ultimate level of functioning. This denial could 
extend over many years. Thomsen (1984) reported mothers of brain damaged patients 
who still denied the impact of the injury for up to ten or fifteen years. However, in some 
cases the family members report that the fundamental aspects of the injured person's 
personality have changed such that the person they knew and loved is "dead". Since the 
recovery process is an uncertain one, with many reasons for hope and despair, feelings 
about the changes may continue to be in turmoil for months and years. This uncertainty 
and the concomitant disorganisation of the grieving process have resulted in the 
development of the term "mobile mourning" (Muir et al 1990). The experience of 
grieving can be put off, sometimes indefinitely, which has been termed "grieving in 
abeyance" (Perlesz & McLachlan 1986). Perlesz and her colleagues have argued that 
until the emotional task of grieving has commenced the family cannot take steps to 
reorganise themselves from the crisis state brought about as a response to the initial 
trauma of the injury to a more adaptive organisation (Perlesz et al 1992) that can cope 
with the burden of long term care. However, the assumption that families of head 
injured patients inevitably reach a stage of acceptance during which roles and 
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relationships are redefined to promote optimal adjustment has not been empirically 
tested. 
The assumption that following bereavement most people do achieve a state of resolution 
has been challenged (Wortman and Silver 1989). The long term complications 
associated with prolonged or otherwise abnormal symptoms of grief have not been 
systematically investigated, partly because no suitable scale has been available. Prigerson 
et al (1995) developed a scale to measure those symptoms of grief that have been shown 
to be distinct from bereavement-related depression and anxiety and to predict long term 
family functioning. They termed these symptoms "complicated grief' and developed the 
Inventory of Complicated Grief (ICG) to assess them. The principal aim of the present 
study is to investigate whether a modified version of the ICG could be a useful predictor 
of adjustment in a UK sample of relatives of brain injured individuals. Previous work 
suggests that the functioning of the primary caregiver is more likely to be associated with 
family adjustment than are measures of severity of injury or demographic variables. The 
relationship between the functioning of the primary caregiver and the presenting 
symptoms of the brain injured individual will also be explored. 
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of the current study is to explore the relationship between grief and family 
adaptation following traumatic brain injury. The study has two broad aims. Firstly, to 
investigate the psychometric properties of the Inventory of Complicated Grief as a 
measure of a sense of loss for relatives of a brain injured population in a UK sample. 
The study will also look at the relationship between complicated grief and levels of 
anxiety and depression. Secondly, the study will explore whether complicated grief plays 
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a role in accounting for family adaptation following traumatic brain injury. It is 
hypothesised that: - 
1. Socio-demographic factors relating to client and carer, and injury related factors such 
as severity of injury, or time since injury, will account for only a small proportion of the 
dependent measures of family functioning and psychological well-being. 
2. Poor family functioning will be related to continuing impairments of behavioural and 
social control in the injured family member, measured by the Neurobehavioural Rating 
Scale, rather than to the original severity of the injury, as measured by length of post 
traumatic amnesia and length of coma. 
3. Individual measures of family functioning, as measured by the subscales of the Family 
Assessment Device, will be explained by the level of grief resolution (measured by the 
modified Inventory of Complicated Grief) for each person, rather than by injury related 
factors. 
METHOD 
1) Participants 
Participants were identified from a sample of 148 patients previously recruited from 
consecutive admissions to Leeds hospitals for an evaluation of the Leeds Head Injury 
Team between June 1993 and February 1995. Criteria for entry in that study were: - 
" Aged 16-65 at the time of injury 
" Normally resident in Leeds, Bradford or Harrogate 
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9 Inpatient admission of 72 hours or more at either the Leeds General Infirmary 
(LGI) or St James University Hospital (SJUH) 
44 patients were not eligible for the original study under the exclusion criteria of a 
premorbid history of psychotic illness, alcohol or drug abuse requiring treatment or 
causing significant life problems, other neurological conditions causing significant 
difficulty at the time of injury, or other serious mental health problems, with the 
exception of treatment for reactive depression. 
The original study therefore followed up a total of 104 cases, all of which were initially 
considered as eligible for the current study (see Table 1). However, 16 were excluded as 
they had no identifiable carer, and 4 were not contacted because the relative lived beyond 
reasonable travelling distance. Three cases were known to the clinical service and were 
not contacted. In two cases this was because the team were in the process of negotiating 
a handover of care to other agencies and did not wish to make fresh contact with the 
families. The third case had recently been re-referred to the team in relation to charges 
of criminal assault and child protection and it was not felt appropriate to contact the 
family about research at this stage. 
In six cases contact was made but this did not result in interview. One carer was in the 
process of moving house and another was ill when initially contacted. Neither responded 
when contacted again. A third case provided a telephone contact which was wrong, and 
did not respond to a further letter. Two relatives were not at home at the agreed 
appointment time and did not respond to subsequent letters. In the final case a mutually 
convenient interview time could not be identified in spite of a number of telephone calls. 
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Interviews were carried out with 15 primary carers (mother or partner) and in a further 
five cases both the primary (mother or partner) and secondary carer (4 fathers, 1 
stepfather) were interviewed. 
Table 1: Breakdown of original sample of 104 cases at follow up. 
Interviewed 20 
Refused 20 
No response to letters 35 
Not contacted/no identified relative 16 
Not contacted/relative lives beyond daily travelling distance 4 
Not contacted/clinical grounds 3 
Contact made/not interviewed 6 
Total 104 
Demographic data on cases where relatives declined to be interviewed or where no 
contact was made was obtained from the original study for comparison with the 
interview sample. These analyses are reported in the Results section. 
In view of the small sample size achieved from the original target group, ethical 
permission was sought to contact cases on the existing clinical caseload of Leeds Head 
Injury Team (HINT). Cases were considered eligible if they met the original study 
criteria of being aged 16-65 at the time of injury, resident of Leeds (Bradford and 
Harrogate residents were not treated by the Leeds HINT), and with an inpatient stay of 
more than 72 hours at either the LGI or SJUH. An additional criteria of being at least 12 
months post injury was set, in order to focus on longer term adaptation rather than acute 
distress. 
Under these criteria there were 23 eligible cases, of which 9 cases formed part of the 
original sample group and had already been approached. Of the remaining 14 cases, 7 
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interviews were arranged with primary carers (mother or partner), and 1 interview with 
primary carer (mother) and secondary carer (sister). 
Table 2: Breakdown of eligible HINT cases not part of original sample. 
Interviewed 8 
No response to letter 2 
Not contacted/clinical grounds 3 
Contact made/no interview 1 
Total 14 
Two relatives did not respond to the initial letter inviting them to take part. Three cases 
were not contacted. In two of these cases the family situation was particularly chaotic at 
the time and the team felt it was inappropriate to involve the families in a research study. 
In the third case the relative had not known the injured person pre-injury and would not 
have been able to complete key parts of the research questionnaires. One final case was 
willing to be interviewed but worked three part time jobs and a mutually convenient 
appointment could not be arranged within the timescale of the research. 
2) Procedure 
Approval was obtained from the research ethics committee in Leeds. 
The named relative interviewed in the previous study where this was known, or the 
injured person if this was unclear, was contacted by letter including an information sheet 
explaining the purpose of the study and saying that the researcher would contact them 
within a few days. Telephone contact where possible was made to explain the nature of 
the study and what their involvement would be, and where appropriate a visit was 
arranged. If the relative declined at this stage no further attempt was made to contact 
them. Where no telephone contact was possible a second letter including a reply slip and 
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a stamped addressed envelope was sent. A third and final letter was sent, which also 
included a stamped addressed envelope. 
Those that consented were visited at their homes. There was one exception where the 
parents of the injured person requested that the interview be held at the hospital site. At 
interview family members present were invited to ask questions about the research and 
were asked to sign a consent form before proceeding with the interview and 
questionnaires. 
The interview and questionnaires covered: 
0 Current socio-demographic status of relative and injured person 
" Current symptoms of the head injured person (NRS) 
. Assessment of family functioning (FAD) 
. Assessment of mood of the relative (HADS, WSRS) 
9 Assessment of loss/grief (ICG) 
Where particular problems were identified and further help requested arrangements were 
made to refer the relatives and injured individual to the Leeds Head Injury Team. This 
was required in two cases. 
3) Measures 
Background Information 
i) Severity of injury was measured in the original study in terms of Glasgow Coma Scale 
(GCS) scores (Teasdale & Jennett, 1974,1976), duration of coma/unconsciousness and 
of post-traumatic amnesia (PTA). The information from the medical records at the two 
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acute hospitals did not always allow for an accurate assessment of GCS scores or 
duration of coma. In discussion with the previous researcher it was apparent that the 
most reliable measure was the retrospective estimate of the duration of PTA. This was 
gained by the researcher in all cases, using careful questioning at interview with the 
injured person and their relative about when the injured person's continuous day-to day 
memory returned. The classification of duration of PTA was that used by Jennett and 
Teasdale (1981): 
" up to an hour (mild) 
9 1-24 hours (moderate) 
0 1-7 days (severe) 
" more than 7 days (very severe) 
For the 8 HINT cases post traumatic amnesia was estimated by the current researcher, 
using the same criteria. 
ii) Educational achievements were recorded together with information about 
employment. For the original sample, premorbid intellectual functioning was estimated 
at six months post injury using the National Adult Reading Test or NART (Nelson 
1991). The NART is widely used in clinical settings as a predictor of pre-injury 
intellectual functioning where there are no acquired reading difficulties. The NART 
consists of 50 irregular words which the subject is asked to read aloud. As irregular 
words they cannot be correctly read phonologically with the result that correct reading 
must be through the lexical route implying previous familiarity with the words. The 
NART has been shown to be resistant to neurological dysfunction (Crawford et al 1987). 
Preinjury IQ estimates were not available for the 8 HINT cases. 
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iii) The carer's emotional state had been assessed at each follow up interview using the 
Wimbledon Self-Report Scale WSRS (Coughlan & Storey 1988). The WSRS was 
developed as a self-rating scale to detect mood disturbances in the general population 
and people with neurological or major physical illnesses. It consists of thirty adjectives 
and phrases describing pleasant and unpleasant feelings. The respondent rates, on a four- 
point scale, how often in the last week they experienced each feeling. For unpleasant 
feelings the ratings are: (a) most of the time; (b) quite often; (c) only occasionally; (d) 
not at all; for pleasant feelings the order is reversed, i. e. (a) not at all; etc. Responses (a) 
and (b) score 1 and (c) and (d) score 0. The scoring on a 1,1,0,0 system effectively 
transforms the scale into a two point one. The scores are totalled and the overall 
response classified as normal (0-7), borderline (8-10) or case (11-30). `Case' indicates a 
clinically significant mood disturbance requiring treatment. 
Measures used at interview 
Examples of all measures used are provided in the appendix. 
a) Modified Inventory of Complicated Grief (Prigerson et al 1995) - see appendix I 
Prigerson and colleagues developed a scale that focuses on the symptoms of grief that 
are distinct from bereavement-related depression and anxiety and which predict long 
term functional impairment. Factor analysis has shown that the Inventory of 
Complicated Grief (ICG) measures a single underlying construct of complicated grief. 
The ICG total score is associated with severity of depressive symptoms and a general 
measure of grief indicating a valid but distinct assessment of emotional distress. 
Individuals with a total score greater than 25 have been found to have significantly worse 
general, mental and physical health, social functioning and bodily pain, as well as 
depression and this has therefore been suggested as the threshold score for determining 
syndromal levels of complicated grief. 
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For the purpose of this study the scale was modified by replacing the word 'death' with 
the word 'injury' and the phrase 'person who died' with the phrase 'person I knew before 
the injury'. Two items were omitted (item 4 and item 8) as the rewording was 
inappropriate. The questionnaire was administered towards the end of the interview 
after discussion with the relative about perceived changes in the injured person. Scoring 
was on a5 point scale of never (0), rarely (1), sometimes (2), often (3), and always (4). 
b) Wimbledon Self Rating Scale (Coughlan & Storey 1988) - see appendix 2 
As this measure had been used in the previous study it was repeated in order to explore 
changes in mood over time for primary carers. 
c) Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Snaith and Zi2mond 1983) - appendix 3 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) is widely used with patients with a 
physical illness because many of the somatic symptoms of depression are excluded. It 
was used in addition to the WSRS in this study as it is more widely used in clinical 
practice and in published research, thereby facilitating comparison with other studies. 
dl Family Assessment Device (Epstein et at 1983) - see appendix 4 
The Family Assessment Device (FAD) is based on the McMaster Model of Family 
Functioning and is made up of seven scales which measure Problem Solving, 
Communication, Roles, Affective Responsiveness, Affective Involvement, Behaviour 
Control and General Functioning. The General Functioning scale assesses the overall 
health of the family and is made up of items that correlated highly with all six scale 
scores. The correlation between the six dimensions scales ranges between 0.4 and 0.6 
but when the effects of the General Functioning Scale are removed the six scales are 
relatively independent. The FAD is moderately correlated with other self-report 
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measures of family functioning, and it differentiates significantly between clinician-rated 
healthy and unhealthy families. Cut off scores have been developed for identifying 
healthy and unhealthy families (Miller et al 1985). The authors found a fairly high 
association with the Beck Depression Inventory (r = 0.67, p< 0.001). 
e) Neurobehavioural Rating Scale (Levin et al 1987b) - see appendix 5 
The Neurobehavioural Rating Scale (NRS) was originally designed for administration 
within a hospital setting on the basis of interview and observation of the injured person. 
There are clear guidelines for administering and scoring the scale items. Although 
further work is needed to establish its validity and reliability in broader clinical settings 
there are few other scales which address the areas of behavioural and social control 
impairment that are widely reported to be predictive of family burden and family 
breakdown. It was used in this study as a way of recording the primary carers' 
perception of current symptomatology and not as an objective measure as originally 
designed. 
RESULTS 
1. Sample Characteristics 
Response Rate 
Of the 104 cases in the original study 20 were followed up for this study, together with 
an additional 8 cases not involved in the earlier study (n=28). A total of 34 relatives 
were interviewed, although in several cases the secondary carer did not complete a full 
data set. 
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Characteristics of the patients 
Comparisons between the injured people identified from the original study and those 
from the HINT caseload showed that the two samples did not differ in terms of age at 
injury, or years of education. Data was not available from the HINT group to compare 
pre-injury IQ levels. The two samples differed in the number of months post injury 
(n=20 mean = 43.3 s. d. =5.6 range 33-52; n=8 mean = 26 s. d. = 13.3 range 14-56; t=4.9 
p<0.001). Visual inspection indicated that the sex ratio of the injured person was 
different in the two groups (male: female n=20 4: 1; n=8 7: 1) but chi-squared 
comparisons were not appropriate as the expected values for female gender were below 
5 for both groups. Similarly, visual inspection indicated that the HINT caseload did not 
include any mild/moderate injuries (PTA < 24 hours), whereas 6/20 of the sample from 
the original study were categorised as mild/moderate injuries. 
The total sample interviewed (n=28) was compared with all those not interviewed from 
the original sample (n=84) and did not differ on the demographic or injury related 
variables as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Characteristics of brain injured individuals in current interview sample (n=28), compared 
with those not interviewed because they refused, did not reply, or were not contacted (n=84). 
Original Interviewed Refusals No reply Not Statistical 
Sample sample contacted test used 
n=104 n=28 n=20 n =40 n=24 n=28 vs. 84 
Sex of injured 78% male 82% male 70% male 78% male 83% male Chi square 
person n. s. 
Age at injury 32 (22,43) 32 (24,45) 38 (23,52) 30 (20,41) 32 (22,38) T test 
(median) n. s 
Severity of Chi square 
injury 64% 79% 45% 65% 71% n. s 
s PTA 
Education 11 (10,11) 11 (10,11) 11 (10,11) 11 (10,11) 11 (10,15) T test 
(median yrs. n. s 
and range) 
63 
The comparison was also made between the pre-injury IQ range of the 20 cases 
interviewed and the 84 not interviewed (see Table 4). Pre injury IQ data was not 
available for the HINT cases. 
Table 4: Comparison of estimated preinjury IQ ranges based on NART scores for the 
interviewed/not interviewed original sample 
Original Interviewed Refusals No reply Not Statistical 
Sample sample contacted test used 
n=104 n=20 n=20 n =40 n=24 n=20 vs. 84 
Est. IQ <90 40% 24% 17% 34% 32% Chi using 
pre 90-110 45% 59% 66% 65% 46% <90/ >90 
injury >110 15% 18% 17% 9% 23% n. s 
The twenty cases contacted who refused to participate did not differ significantly from 
those interviewed, not contacted, or where there was no response although the data in 
Table 3 would suggest that a smaller proportion of this group may have been severely 
injured (45% with PTA > 24 hours). At least three relatives made comments when they 
declined. to be interviewed which suggested there were no ongoing problems, for 
example, "there aren't any changes.. it wasn't a bad head injury.. it was his hands really" 
and "everything is alright now". Two relatives declined saying "it's all behind us now" 
and "I don't want to be reminded". Several relatives commented that they had been 
interviewed twice already and did not want to be involved again. 
Characteristics of relatives 
In the original sample of 104 head injured clients the identified primary carers were 
predominantly female (82%) and this was still the case at interview (85%). The 
proportion of partners remained the same (43%) but there was an increase in the 
percentage of parents interviewed (35 % in the original sample; 51% at interview). The 
age ranges of the relatives interviewed were not significantly different. 
64 
2. Psychometric investigation of the Inventory of Complicated Grief 
(ICG) 
The first aim of the study was to investigate the utility of the Inventory of Complicated 
Grief for relatives of brain injured people in a UK sample. Table 5 shows the reliability 
of the modified scale used for this study and the data presented by the original authors 
(Prigerson et al 1995). 
Table 5 Reliability of the modified Inventory of Complicated Grief. 
Cronbach's alpha Mean Standard deviation 
Modified ICG n=34 0.91 19.7 17.3 
ICG 0.94 
Table 6 (see below) shows the item-total correlations for the individual items with the 
total score. The correlations were at or above r=0.50 for all items except question 9, 
which assessed the extent to which the relative felt pain in the same area of their body or 
had some of the same symptoms as the injured person. The item assessing the sense of 
loneliness was most highly correlated with ICG total score (r-0.91), followed by the 
feeling that life is empty since this person was injured (r-0.90), preoccupation with 
thoughts about the injured person to the point of distraction (r=0.88), and not being able 
to accept the loss of the person as they were preinjury (r=0.88). 
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Table 6: Item correlations for Modified Inventory of Complicated Grief with total ICG score 
(n=34). 
Item Pearson Mean SD 
1. I think about this person so much it's hard for me to do the 
things I normally do 
. 
88** 1.27 1.33 
2. Memories of the person I knew before the injury upset me . 78** 1.27 1.45 
3. I feel I cannot accept the loss of the person I knew before the 
injury 
. 88** 1.35 1.63 
4. I feel drawn to places and things associated with the person I 
knew before the injury 
. 79** 0.85 1.35 
5. I can't help feeling angry about the injury . 82** 2.12 1.32 
6. I feel disbelief over what happened . 
73** 2.00 1.23 
7. Ever since the injury it is hard for me to trust people . 
67** 1.15 1.13 
8. Ever since the injury I feel like I have lost the ability to care 
about other people or I feel distant from people I care about 
. 
65** 0.53 0.90 
9. I have pain in the same area of my body or have some of the 
same symptoms as the injured person 
. 
38 0.91 3.79 
10. I go out of my way to avoid reminders of the person I knew 
before the injury 
. 
5* 0.47 0.83 
11. I feel that life is empty since this person was injured. . 9** 1.03 1.45 
12. I hear the voice of the person I knew before the injury speak to 
me 
. 72** 0.50 1.08 
13. I see the person I knew before the injury stand before me . 
5* 1.41 1.64 
14. I feel that it is unfair that I'm OK when this person is injured . 87** 1.03 1.45 
15. I feel bitter over this person's injury . 
54** 1.79 1.34 
16.1 feel envious of others who have not lost someone close . 
69** 0.88 1.12 
17. I feel lonely a great deal of the time ever since he/she had their 
injury 
. 91** 1.15 1.44 
* significant at P<0.05. ** significant at P< 0.001 level 
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3. Psychometric properties of Family Assessment Device (FAD). 
The sample size was too small to permit factor analysis of the FAD. Table 7 presents the 
number of items, reliability levels, means and standard deviations for each of the seven 
scales based on the responses of the 32 relatives who completed the scale at interview, 
and compares these with the figures available in the original validation study using the 
responses of 503 individuals (see Epstein et al 1983). Reliability coefficients were 
satisfactory for all scales except behaviour control (Cronbach's alpha = 0.41). This scale 
was excluded from further analysis. 
Table 7: Reliabilities, Means and Standard Deviations of the Seven Scales of the Family 
Assessment Device for the current sample (n=32) and for the original sample (n=503, Epstein et al 
1983). 
Cronbach's Standard Number 
alpha Mean Deviation of Items 
n=32 n=503 n=32 n=503 n=32 n=503 
Problem Solving . 
71 
. 
74 2.0 2.3 
. 
25 
. 
47 5 
Communication 
. 
60 
. 
75 2.2 2.3 
.2 . 
51 6 
Roles . 82 . 72 2.4 2.4 . 27 . 43 8 
Affective Responsiveness . 73 . 83 2.1 2.4 . 23 . 61 6 
Affective Involvement . 64 . 78 2.1 2.2 . 24 . 50 7 
Behaviour Control . 
41 
. 
72 2.0 2.0 
. 
19 
. 
41 9 
General Functioning . 
87 
. 
92 2.0 2.2 
. 68 . 
58 12 
4. Psychometric properties of the Mood Questionnaires. 
In all analyses the Wimbledon Self Report Scale (WSRS) and the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale (HADS) produced the same pattern of results. As the HADS is more 
widely recognised, only these results are given in this paper with the exception of the 
data on mood scores over time (see page 72). 
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Table 8: Reliabilities, Means and Standard Deviations of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale (RADS) and Wimbledon Self Report Scale (WSRS). 
Reliability 
(Cronbach's Standard Number 
alpha) Mean Deviation of Items 
RADS anxiety 0.93 8.09 5.58 7 
n=33 
HADS depression 0.83 4.76 3.72 7 
n=33 
WSRS 0.97 7.56 9.23 30 
n=31 
5. Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: - Relationship of socio-demographic variables to family adjustment. 
Correlations were performed between the Family Assessment Device scales (FAD) and 
relevant socio-demographic variables (see Table 9). Spearman's correlations were used 
for the gender of the injured- person and relative. Pearson's correlations were used for 
the variables of age, pre-injury IQ, and income of the relatives at interview. 
' Significant correlations were found for gender of the head injured person with all FAD 
scales except Affective Involvement i. e. where the injured person was male the scores on 
the FAD scales were higher. Higher FAD scores are associated with poorer family 
adaptation. The other significant correlations were between income range and FAD- 
affective involvement and FAD-affective responsiveness. In both cases the negative 
correlation suggests that a higher income is associated with fewer family adjustment 
problems as measured by these two subscales. 
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Table 9. Pearson's correlations of socio-demographic variables of patient and relative with family 
adjustment. 
FAD sub- 
scales © 
Age of tbi at 
injury 
n=28 
Pre-injury 
IQ range 
n=20 
Age at 
interview of 
relative 
n=32 
Income per 
household at 
interview 
n=28 
FAD-R 
. 
12 -. 27 -. 06 -. 37 
FAD-PS 
. 
15 -. 14 -. 24 -. 18 
FAD-GF 
. 20 -. 20 -. 07 -. 33 
FAD-C 
. 
19 -. 09 -. 11 -. 05 
FAD-AR 
. 
05 -. 10 . 
05 -. 42 
FAD-Al 
. 
26 
. 
09 -. 03 -. 48 * 
* significant at p<0.05. 
D Family Assessment Device subscales: Roles (FAD-R), Problem Solving (FAD-PS), 
General Functioning (FAD-GF), Communication (FAD-C), Affective Responsiveness 
(FAD-AR), Affective Involvement (FAD-AI). 
T-tests were used to compare the mean scores for males and females for both the gender 
of the injured person and of the relative interviewed. No significant effects on family 
adjustment were found for the gender of the relative interviewed. Significant effects 
were found for the effect of gender of the injured person and family functioning (see 
Table 10). Further analysis of this effect was not possible because of the small number of 
female injured participants. 
Table 10. Comparison of mean scores for male and female injured persons with family adjustment 
FAD sub- FAD-AI FAD-AR FAD-C FAD-GF FAD-PS FAD-GF 
scales© mean score mean score mean score mean score mean score mean score 
and s. d. and s. d. and s. d. and s. d. and s. d. and s. d. 
Female n=5 12.0 ± 1.9 12.2 ± 0.8 9.6 ± 3.4 17.4 ± 5.1 7.2 ± 2.1 13.2 ± 4.8 
Male n=23 13.0 ± 2.7 14 ± 1.8 13.7 ± 2.0 25.1 ± 4.7 10.9 ± 1.4 17.6 ± 2.8 
n. s t=-3.38 * t=-3.66 ** t=-3.1 * t=-4.89 ** t=-2.82 * 
* significant at p< 0.05. ** significant at p< 0.001 
© Family Assessment Device subscales: Roles (FAD-R), Problem Solving (FAD-PS), General 
Functioning (FAD-GF), Communication (FAD-C), Affective Responsiveness (FAD-AR), Affective 
Involvement (FAD-AI). 
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Hypothesis 2: - Level of impairment and family adjustment. 
i) Severity of original injury 
Correlations were calculated between the six FAD scales and the mood scales (Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale and the Wimbledon Self Report Scale) and severity of 
original injury as measured by length of post traumatic amnesia (PTA) and worst 
Glasgow Coma Scale Score (GCS). All correlations were non significant i. e. neither 
PTA nor worst GCS score were correlated with any of the FAD scales or with current 
mood state (rs ranged from -0.08 - 0.28, n. s. ). 
ii) Severity of current symptoms 
The reliability of the Neurobehavioural Rating Scale (NRS) was calculated (Cronbach's 
alpha = 0.87 mean 67.9 S. D. 38.2). Severity of current problems as measured by NRS 
was significantly correlated with FAD-Roles (t=0.5, p<0.008) and FAD-Affective 
Involvement (r=0.5, p<0.009) but not with the other FAD scales. 
The NRS was also correlated with raised anxiety and depression on the Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale (HADS-Anxiety r=0.71, p<0.001; HADS-Depression r=0.80, 
p<0.001). On examining the correlations with the HADS, it was apparent that HADS- 
Anxiety and HADS-Depression were associated with both NRS and FAD-Roles and 
FAD-Affective Involvement, raising the question as to whether the relatives' mood was 
affecting their perception of problems as identified using the NRS. 
Table 11. Partial Correlations of Neurobehavioural Rating Scale total score (NRS) and FAD-roles 
(FAD-R) and FAD-affective involvement (FAD-AI) with Anxiety and Depression removed. 
Zero Order Correlations Partial correlations Partial correlations 
controlling for HADS- controlling for HADS- 
Anxie Depression 
NRS and FAD-R 0.50 * 0.24 -. 06 
NRS and FAD-AI 0.50 * 0.34 -. 02 
* significant at p<0.05 
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Partial correlations of NRS total score with FAD-Roles and with FAD-Affective 
Involvement were carried out to see the effect of controlling HADS-Anxiety and HADS- 
Depression. With the removal of HADS-Depression the correlations between NRS and 
FAD-Roles and FAD-Affective Involvement disappeared and with the removal of 
HADS-Anxiety the correlation was non-significant (see Table 10). This suggests that the 
association of NRS with the FAD scales was attributable to the effects of mood on both 
scores. 
Hypothesis 3: - The role of complicated grief in accounting for family adjustment. 
Bivariate correlations showed that total score on the Inventory of Complicated Grief was 
significantly associated with FAD-Roles (r=0.53 p<0.05), FAD-General Functioning 
(x0.37 p<0.05) and FAD-Affective Involvement (r=0.44 p<0.05), but not with FAD- 
Problem Solving (r=0.12 p=0.50), FAD-Communication (r=0.21 p=0.26), FAD- 
Affective Responsiveness (r-0.09 p=0.63). However, the three FAD scales of Roles, 
General Functioning and Affective Involvement were also associated with 
Neurobehavioural Rating Scale (NRS), HADS-Anxiety and HADS-Depression, raising a 
question about the unique contribution that the ICG is making to variance in FAD 
scores. In Table Il are shown the partial correlations for FAD-Roles, General 
Functioning and Affective Involvement with ICG when each of these variables is 
controlled for. Partial correlations indicate the degree of association between 
complicated grief and family adjustment after controlling for any portion of the variance 
which is shared with the control variable. However, when depression scores are 
removed the correlation between the FAD and the ICG disappears. The effect is not as 
dramatic with the removal of the anxiety scores but the correlations are not significant. 
One tailed tests were used, as it was hypothesised that any effect of mood would be 
71 
unidirectional. Interestingly, a significant association was obtained between ICG and 
FAD-Roles after controlling for NRS, suggesting perhaps that the behavioural problems 
of the injured person do not significantly affect the impact of grief on family-role 
functions. 
Table 12. Zero Order and Partial Correlations between FAD scales and Inventory of Complicated 
Griefcontrolling for mood (HADS-anxiety and -depression), Neurobehavioural Rating Scale Score. 
ICG Zero 
order 
correlation 
HADS-D HADS-A NRS total 
FAD-R . 53** . 07 ns . 29 ns . 27* 
FAD-GF . 37* -. 18 ns . 10 ns . 15 ns 
FAD-AI . 44* -. 08 ns . 
27 ns . 11 ns 
*significant at p<0.05 
**significant at p<0.001 
6. Mood and Grief 
A supplementary aim of the study was to examine the validity of the ICG as independent 
from mood. In their original paper Prigerson et al (1995) suggested that the ICG could 
identify a component of grief that was distinct from anxiety and depression. It has not 
proved possible in this study to separate the components of grief from those of anxiety 
and depression. 
The Wimbledon Self Report Scale was used in the current study in order to explore the 
changes in mood over time in the original sample. Table 12 describes the emotional state 
of the relatives at six, twelve and eighteen months post injury and again at follow up 
(primary carers only). Data is not presented for the 8 cases where no previous 
interviews had taken place. 
72 
Table 13. Emotional state on the Wimbledon Self Report Scale for relatives at 6,12,18 months 
post injury and at follow up in current study, compared with a general population sample (data 
from Coughlan & Storey 1988). 
Time since injury N Median raw 
score 
Inter-quartile 
range 
Borderline/case 
N 
6 months 96 3.5 1,10 31 (33%) 
12 months 72 2.0 0,9 24 (34%) 
18 months 37 3.0 0,10 13 (35%) 
Follow up at mean 43.. 3 
months (range 33-52) 
20 1.0 0,8 6 (30%) 
General population 274 - - 33 (12%) 
Approximately one third of relatives scored within the range that would warrant further 
investigation in clinical practice (scores of 8 or more) up to eighteen months post injury, 
and at follow up 30% of the relatives were scoring within this range. Only 12% of the 
general population would be expected to score in this range, indicating that these 
relatives continue to experience considerable mood disturbance at an average of over 
three and a half years post injury. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study's overall aim was to explore the relationship between grief and family 
adaptation following traumatic brain injury. Specifically, the study investigated whether 
complicated grief could be identified as having a particular role in accounting for family 
adaptation over and above factors such as severity of injury, socio-demographic variables 
and other mood related variables. 
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The first hypothesis was that socio-demographic variables relating to the injured person 
and the relative would account for only a small proportion of the dependent measures of 
family functioning and psychological well-being. The results support this hypothesis, in 
that there were few significant correlations. Gender of the injured person had an effect 
on five out of six FAD scales, suggesting that where the injured person is male, there are 
more problems of adjustment within the family. It was not possible to investigate the 
relationship between the variables separately for men and women because of the small 
sample size. 
The lack of significant correlations between socio-demographic variables and 
psychological adjustment is consistent with previous studies which have also found 
demographic variables to be poor predictors of longer term psychological adjustment in 
relatives. 
The second hypothesis related to the role of continuing impairments in the behaviour and 
social control of the injured person in contributing to poor family adjustment and 
psychological distress in relatives. A high level of continuing behavioural disturbance as 
measured by the Neurobehavioural Rating Scale was correlated with two subscales of 
the FAD, i. e. FAD-Roles and FAD-Affective Involvement. These are two of the three 
scales identified by Kreutzer et al (1994a) as being associated most closely with 
continuing problems in family functioning. However in the current study the correlations 
between the NRS and the FAD scales could be accounted for by the mood component 
measured by HADS-anxiety and HADS-depression, with the effect being more marked 
for the depression scale. The NRS was being used as a subjective measure of continuing 
behavioural problems, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that as such it was likely to 
be closely correlated with the relatives' mood state. This is consistent with previous 
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suggestions that indicate that relatives' perceptions of the injured person and their 
deficits is a better predictor of the adjustment of the relative. The lack of objective 
measurement of the current functioning of the injured person is a limitation in this study. 
However, Kreutzer et al (1994a, 1994b) found a similar relationship between the 
caregiver's report of their own and the patient's complaints, and in their study they had 
carried out a range of independent neuropsychological measures of the patient's 
functioning. They were therefore able to examine the hypothesis that caregivers were 
`projecting' their own symptoms onto the patients. Further analysis of their data did not 
support the conclusion that the relationship between patient symptoms and caregiver 
distress was a direct result of the methodology of using self report by carers to assess 
patient symptoms. Thus, although it would have been helpful to have an objective 
measurement of the functioning of the injured person in the current study in order to 
disentangle the effect of the mood state of the carers, it is not clear that this in itself 
would have altered the overall interpretation of the results. 
The main aim of the study was to explore the utility of the Inventory of Complicated 
Grief as a predictor of family adjustment with a sample of relatives of people who have 
sustained a traumatic brain injury. The inventory itself in its modified form did have 
good internal consistency, although one item was weakly correlated with the total scale 
score. The scores on the modified ICG were associated with some aspects of family 
adjustment, FAD-roles, FAD-affective involvement, and FAD-general functioning but 
these correlations became non significant when the effects of anxiety and depression 
were controlled for. Psychological distress in the relative did seem to be linked to family 
adaptation as predicted, but it was not possible to identify a factor of complicated grief 
over and above the effects of anxiety and depression to account for successful family 
adaptation. However, the items most highly correlated both with the total grief rating 
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and individually with measures of family functioning and mood were those that identified 
loneliness, emptiness and envy of those who have not lost someone. These are difficult 
emotions to elicit from relatives as they often perceive them as evidence of disloyalty or 
selfishness. The questionnaire, subject to further modifications, may provide a useful 
therapeutic tool whereby these emotions can be more easily acknowledged. 
Although the Inventory of Complicated Grief did not identify a separate concept of 
complicated grief in this study, further investigation into its psychometric properties and 
its predictive value is required as it appears to have potential to be a useful measure. 
Provided they had already identified some changes in their relative earlier in the 
interview, relatives who completed the modified ICG found the concept of loss 
meaningful and most of the questions easy to respond to. For those who reported that 
their relative had made a full recovery, the questions were more difficult to complete and 
several relatives commented that it was as if they were being asked to talk about 
someone who had died. Specific items were confusing to relatives and could be 
amended in a future study, for example, item 13, `I see the person I knew before the 
injury stand before me'. 
This study represents one of the few attempts to explore the concept of loss in a UK 
sample of relatives of head injured people. It is limited by its small sample size. It would 
be valuable in further work to utilise an objective rating of either the Neurobehavioural 
Rating Scale, or one of the limited number of alternative scales designed to look at 
longer term social and behavioural functioning. 
The aim of identifying a measure of loss is driven by the clinical need to work with family 
members to help them to adjust to the major change in their lifestyles following a 
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traumatic brain injury in a close family member. Many family members are counselled or 
prescribed medication for depression in the years following the injury to their relative but 
there is little evidence to suggest that this model of treatment is successful. The evidence 
actually suggests that relatives continue with high levels of depression and anxiety for 
many years after the injury. Beyond measuring the levels of emotional disturbance in 
family members there has been little theoretically driven work to understand the factors 
influencing the development and maintenance of these emotional states. One of the 
potential avenues to explore is the model of unresolved and unacknowledged grief. Lack 
of recognition of the loss by the broader family and social network is a common theme in 
clinical practice. The current study represents an attempt to acknowledge that clinical 
problem. The Inventory of Complicated Grief does allow carers to express difficult 
emotions, which in turn allows therapists an opportunity to work with relatives to help 
them understand the situation and move forward. In spite of its limitations the study has 
provided useful information to allow for a more systematic approach to investigating the 
possible role of complicated grief in family adaptation following traumatic brain injury. 
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CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
ORIGINS OF THE PROJECT 
The idea for the project arose directly from my clinical role in the rehabilitation and 
support for people who have sustained traumatic brain injury. I work closely with 
families who are struggling to come to terms with the sustained trauma of living with 
someone who has suffered a brain injury. During the rehabilitation process, which 
might involve working with a family over a two or three year period, it happened quite 
frequently that a family member would say, at some point, "it would have been better if 
he'd died" or "I lost my son that day.. . even though 
he's sitting there looking the 
same-he's not the same person". For all these relatives the acknowledgement of this 
sense of loss felt like a defining moment in their adjustment, but it was difficult to 
predict whether the relative would then continue in their caring role, or whether they 
would decide to leave the situation. 
The concept of loss in its broader sense e. g. loss of function, of ability, of role, and of 
the person you used to be or know, is an important theme in rehabilitation. For the 
relatives there seemed to be parallels with issues that arose with bereavement, but at the 
same time the continuing presence of the person made the comparison difficult. 
However, some colleagues attended a conference in Australia in 1996 which included a 
paper from the Family Therapy Centre in Melbourne (Douglas 1996) where there had 
been a study looking at grief in the families of traumatic brain injured individuals. The 
audiocassettes of the presentation discussed the concepts of `grieving in abeyance' 
(Perlesz & McLachlan 1986) and `mobile mourning' (Muir et al 1990), which seemed 
to describe some of the clinical features seen in my clients. 
84 
One of the factors discussed in the Australian presentation was the impact of different 
coping strategies and whether it was possible to help families adjust by exploring and 
developing their coping. When I explored the literature on coping strategies more 
generally, it was clear that there was a debate about when certain strategies were most 
appropriate. I was interested in this because of similar themes that had arisen in another 
review I had recently carried out of the literature on the role of families in the 
behavioural management of people with traumatic brain injury. Family education 
programmes were an important feature in the literature, and it was apparent that family 
education programmes were gradually shifting in emphasis from emotion-focused 
coping strategies towards problem-focused coping. In the American literature in 
particular, problem-focused training was being advocated as more appropriate for 
unresolvable situations. The Australian literature, however, seemed to suggest that 
unless the emotional state was addressed, if not first then in parallel with problem- 
focused training, then the relatives would not be able to make use of the practical 
advice. At this stage I considered using qualitative methodology to carry out an in- 
depth analysis of the coping processes used by relatives following traumatic brain 
injury. Although I was unfamiliar with the methodology, it felt like an opportunity and 
a challenge. However I was concerned about the identification of suitable participants. 
In particular I was concerned because I provided the major clinical service to families in 
the local area, and I felt it would be difficult to identify cases in which I had either not 
been involved or in which I would not feel obliged to become involved should the 
situation require intervention. Adding to an already overstretched caseload was not the 
object of the exercise. 
85 
At this point I found the number of ideas and possibilities somewhat overwhelming. It 
was difficult to focus down on a specific area and make it into a practical proposition. 
Faced on a daily basis with the clinical need, I wanted to solve it all instantly. The 
identification of a specific research question was one of the most challenging parts of 
the process for me. In the end the choice of project was guided by a combination of 
practical changes and further reading around the key areas of family adaptation and 
grief and loss. 
1. Change of Job 
The decision to change my job in the middle of the degree presented both opportunities 
and challenges. Inevitably the process of leaving one post and establishing myself in a 
new service within a different health region occupied my time and my thinking for a 
number of months. However, the change also provided me with access to an existing 
database of traumatically brain injured clients and carers, which made it easier to 
consider exploring adjustment issues over a longer follow-up period. In addition, by 
moving to a different health region I was confident that I would not have been involved 
in any previous interventions. 
2. Identification of a measurement scale for family adaptation. 
I had been interested for several years in the idea of measuring family functioning and 
had collected various measures as I came across them in clinical practice. However, I 
had not seriously investigated the literature. This project encouraged me to explore the 
literature more thoroughly. This highlighted several recent papers that had used a 
particular family assessment scale that I had come across several years previously but 
had been unsure about using with my particular client group. Reading the various 
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papers gave me greater confidence that this measure could potentially provide useful 
information. 
3. Identification of a measurement scale for unresolved grief. 
The information from the Australian conference had suggested that there were various 
measures to assess grief, some of which could be adapted for use with a brain injured 
population. I carried out another literature search of the areas of grief and loss in order 
to locate these measures and also to get a general sense of whether the notions of loss 
were in fact useful concepts with this client group. During this search I found a paper 
describing the measurement of complicated grief, including a scale that in my view had 
potential to be adapted to assess unresolved grief following traumatic brain injury. 
With the combination of the practical job changes, and the identification of potentially 
useful measures, I was finally able to produce a more specific outline proposal. In the 
end this proposal was very different from what I had earlier envisaged. Instead of 
exploring coping strategies using qualitative methodology, I now planned to test the 
hypothesis that family members experience a grief reaction following traumatic brain 
injury, and that this reaction affects their adaptation to the situation. 
TIMESCALE AND PROGRESS 
Initial discussions with my supervisor about carers and coping strategies took place in 
summer 1996 i. e. six months into the course. At that stage I was thinking about a 
qualitative analysis of positive coping in family members. Due to serious family illness 
and the decision to change jobs, there was then a six month gap in the thinking process. 
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When I took up my new post in February 1997 1 had negotiated dedicated study time. 
This, together with support from the new service for a follow-up study of the existing 
database, helped me to focus my ideas more rapidly. My own thinking had shifted in 
the intervening months with the feedback from the Australian Conference, and further 
discussions with colleagues about carers and loss. Once the ideas were clear the 
proposal was straightforward to write. It was submitted to the training course 
committee by April 1997, and also to the Ethics Committee in Leeds. Initial discussion 
had suggested that the project might receive Chair's approval, but in the end the full 
proposal had to be submitted. At the same time my employing Trust implemented a 
new Research and Development strategy which required that the proposal had to be 
submitted to their R&D Directorate in order to obtain the appropriate indemnity cover. 
The University approval came through in July 1997 with just a few points of 
clarification. The R&D directorate in Leeds also agreed the proposal with no 
amendments. "In principle" agreement came through from the Ethics Committee 
subject to an additional letter to the general practitioner of all relatives interviewed. 
Full approval was granted in August 1997.1 had been aware of the problems 
experienced by colleagues in gaining ethical permission, but for this particular project 
the process WAS relatively straightforward. 
In August 1997 letters were sent to all potential participants as outlined in the research 
paper. These letters were followed by telephone calls wherever a number was available, 
but unfortunately many of the numbers on the original database were now unobtainable. 
When a second letter complete with reply slip and stamped addressed envelope had a 
very limited return rate I became concerned about the difficulty in actually making 
contact with sufficient numbers of people. The original database had identified 104 
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cases which had seemed sufficiently large to allow for a reasonable attrition rate. I had 
expected that there would be a significant number of refusals, both actively and through 
failure to respond, but the numbers interviewed were lower than anticipated. Although 
the low number was disappointing, it was not unexpected. Apart from issues specific to 
this client group (see below) I knew from previous work that one of the unwritten laws 
of research is that the seemingly endless stream of suitable participants dries up 
immediately you start the research project. After the second letter, I decided to 
approach families living beyond the Leeds border but within travelling distance, and I 
also re-contacted the Ethics Committee to gain permission to extend the project to 
include appropriate cases from the community head injury team service. This 
permission was granted rapidly by Chair's approval and without need to submit any 
further information. 
Interviews were carried out between September and mid-November. A further 
disappointment was that the interviews were predominantly with the primary carers, and 
occasionally also with spouses of primary carers. The hope had been to get a number of 
members of the same family together in an attempt to look at issues for different family 
members and also because this would have increased substantially the number of 
participants. 
Data analysis was more straightforward than anticipated. Before beginning the project I 
had been concerned about the analysis stage since my recollection of data analysis 
involved giving hand-written sheets to data processing technicians, sitting by the 
mainframe trying to remember the appropriate line of instruction to type, and then 
walking back to data processing to collect the results. The developments in technology 
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and in SPSS were a revelation and a delight, making the whole process so much quicker 
and easier. 
It was only in the final stages of writing up of the project that the pressure of time 
became a major factor, and choices had to be made about how to allocate time between 
the demands of a full-time clinical job, the research, and having a life. However, with a 
short deadline it was easier to prioritise because there was a clear endpoint. 
AIDS AND BARRIERS TO PROGRESS 
1. Supervision 
In the early stages when there were so many ideas and possibilities it was extremely 
helpful to discuss these with my supervisor, who was able to direct me towards useful 
starting points in the literature and eventually to help me to isolate the relevant ideas 
and tighten up on my thinking process. Good supervision was also important at this 
stage in order to ensure that the study was methodologically sound, and this had 
enormous benefits subsequently when it came to the analysis stage. 
2. Participant numbers 
I was aware from my own experience and that of friends and colleagues that it is always 
more difficult than anticipated to contact sufficient numbers of participants. I was not 
therefore surprised by the problems with the current study, although I was disappointed. 
Although I took steps to increase the response rate, in the end this had only a limited 
effect. With hindsight I feel that I could have been more aware of the potential 
problem, given my knowledge of the clinical population in question. I feel that closer 
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inspection of the original sample data might have predicted a low response rate for a 
number of reasons: 
a) A high proportion of mild/moderate injured people, who were more likely therefore 
to have made a full recovery and not to respond to yet another reminder of the 
injury. 
b) A high proportion of assault cases, which tend to occur in young unemployed men 
who form a transient population likely to be lost to follow up. 
c) The length of time since injury coupled with the fact that some families had already 
been interviewed on at least two occasions. 
If I were carrying out a similar follow-up study in the future, particularly if I was again 
picking up on another researcher's data, I would place greater emphasis on exploring 
the characteristics of the suggested participant group before specifying the 
methodology. 
In spite of these reservations and the benefits of hindsight there were strong reasons for 
using this sample which remain valid, including the fact that the follow-up data was 
directly relevant to arguments about service provision for people longer term after 
traumatic brain injury and to ongoing discussions about the funding of my clinical 
service. 
3. Measurement problems. 
The identification of appropriate measurement tools was a major part of the early 
discussions and thinking about this project. Having identified what seemed to be 
appropriate measures, it felt during the process of interview and analysis that each of the 
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tools was unsatisfactory in some way. The Inventory of Complicated Grief in its 
amended version was acceptable and comprehensible to family members but it actually 
needed more work to adapt it for use with this population. In this study it was being 
used as the dependent measure and as such was an important measurement tool, without 
its validity and reliability having been adequately established. 
Similarly, the Neurobehavioural Rating Scale is one of the few published scales that 
look at social and behavioural changes after brain injury. As such it seemed appropriate 
for the study, but its reliability has been established in a limited number of settings, and 
usually more acutely. More importantly, in the current study it was being used as a 
subjective measure of the injured person's current functioning, as perceived by the 
relative, rather than an objective measure. This is one of the major limitations of the 
study in that it restricts the interpretation of the data. To have avoided this limitation 
would have necessitated an in-depth interview with each injured person, including 
psychometric assessment, which would have created an enormous additional time 
component to the study. It would probably have reduced the response rate still further 
as a number of relatives who agreed to be interviewed did so on the understanding that 
it would not involve the injured person who had already stated that they wanted no 
further follow-up. 
The difficulty in identifying appropriate measures is not unique to this study. 
Throughout the literature different studies have used or amended different measures as I 
have done. This process, whilst understandable, has made it difficult to compare across 
studies. 
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4. Resources 
a) access to library facilities and interlibrary loans 
I was fortunate in that I was able to utilise my study time to visit the library to collect 
books and order articles. Very few of the specialist books and articles were directly 
available and it was essential therefore to make use of the interlibrary loan system. 
Unfortunately, articles with promising titles or abstracts frequently turned out to be 
irrelevant or unhelpful. 
b) time 
This was a crucial and valuable resource. Working full-time and attempting to complete 
the clinical doctorate, particularly the research thesis, was difficult. It became possible 
only when I negotiated and took dedicated study time. In the final few months, it was 
also necessary to invest some of my annual leave and personal time. This was 
particularly important as a way of timetabling sufficient `chunks' of time. There were 
certain stages both in the data analysis and in the write-up which could not in my view 
be achieved through small snatches of time between other commitments. 
c) computers 
I would not have been able to juggle my work, research and home commitments without 
the benefit of my home computer. Again, this was particularly relevant for the analysis 
and write-up stages, as I was then able to work to my own schedule, and not have to 
negotiate access to buildings, equipment etc. 
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5. Professional isolation 
I was fortunate in that my immediate team colleagues were generally supportive, 
especially in terms of accepting my time and intellectual commitment to the research 
during the final few months, even though this inevitably had repercussions for them in 
terms of workload and decision making. In spite of their tolerance and their support for 
me personally, they were unable to provide support in the form of understanding of the 
demands and stresses of research. Working in a community team with no other 
psychologists is professionally isolating at the best of times, but even more so when 
trying to carry out research. Senior psychologists, particularly those working in 
specialist posts in multidisciplinary teams often have little contact with other 
psychologists, and even less with those who regularly carry out research. One of the 
reasons for doing the D. Clin. Psych. was to gain confidence in my own ability to 
complete the research in spite of this isolation. What actually happened was that the 
isolation was highlighted, together with the practical problems this created. Even when 
I had agreed study time which I took, there was a major problem in juggling the 
demands of a full time clinical job with the need to access staff, equipment, libraries etc 
in a different city. Study leave time would be booked months ahead to prevent it being 
swallowed by clinical demands, but then would not fit in with the availability of staff, or 
university holiday periods. 
REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Origins of project 
I found the process of identifying the specifics of the research project particularly 
challenging. I felt there was a conflict between my `clinical hat' which wanted to sort 
the problem and address directly the distress, versus the `research hat' which was 
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looking to contribute to the greater understanding and body of knowledge. It may be 
that this is a particular problem for clinicians working with client populations with 
chronic problems and high levels of distress, where the complex questions and the 
messy lives that face you every day do not sit easily in the tight framework and 
methodology of research. I found it difficult to translate the theoretical justification for 
the research into a clinical justification, particularly when interviewing distressed 
clients. 
2. Research administration 
With the benefit of previous research experience I was aware of the length of time it 
could take to set up a research project, including potential difficulties with submissions 
to relevant bodies such as Ethics Committees. I was also aware of the need to keep 
clear records of the interview process, which is of course good clinical practice. 
However, the amount of time that it took to identify the project, and produce the 
relevant paperwork even for such a small-scale study was a luxury in a busy clinical 
post. I have been involved in submitting proposals for larger scale research bids and I 
am aware of how much time this takes. The recent developments in accounting for 
research time in the NHS may help to raise the profile of this issue by acknowledging 
the time spent in pre-protocol work. I have some concerns that the emphasis on 
formalising this work, and the various hurdles of submission and re-submission, may 
deter all but the dedicated and the experienced. However, on a personal note, I hope 
that the fact that the process was relatively straightforward for this particular project 
will encourage me to pursue further projects, even in the face of the paperwork. 
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3. Research process 
It has been many years since I carried out clinical research rather than service or staff 
evaluations. The previous clinical study had been during my clinical training i. e. when I 
was relatively inexperienced in clinical interviewing. I was very aware in the current 
study of the difference between interviewing for the purposes of the research study and 
my normal clinical interviewing. As a clinician, when I visit a home or meet with a new 
client I am empowered to ask questions and to direct the conversation. Because of the 
nature of my client group I usually need to explain who I am, why I am there, what I do 
and often have to persuade or negotiate with clients and carers. However, I am there to 
offer something to the client or carer, and do not need to justify my presence. If clients 
or carers are angry or offensive I know how to handle the situation, and what 
groundrules to set. If they want to reject what is on offer I know the limitations of my 
powers of persuasion and how to leave them with a route back into the service at a later 
date. With the research interviewing I was without that set of justifications for being 
there, and asking something of them without being in a position to give anything. Once 
I had gained the relevant information I felt I had to engage in conversation or to make 
some form of social gesture. On the few occasions where the family was in crisis it was 
much easier for me to gain the data as I was also able to step back into the role of 
provider of a service rather than a supplicant searching for data. Throughout the 
process I was sustained by my clinical sense that this was a valuable exercise and that I 
could see its relevance if not to the person I was interviewing then to others. If I was to 
carry out further research it is this commitment to the purpose and value of the research 
question that would take a higher priority. 
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Future Research? 
I feel strongly that the issues addressed in this research project are important and should 
be more widely disseminated. The forum for doing so is through publication. There is 
further work that needs to be done to identify the time course and contributing factors to 
family adaptation following traumatic brain injury and I am keen to carry out further 
research in this area. However, my experience of the current project has taught me that 
for future projects I need to ensure that: 
a) I identify colleagues with interests and experience in similar areas of research. 
b) I identify a research question that I feel is relevant to my clinical experience. 
c) I have access to adequate resources to complete the project. 
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Sometimes months after a head injury people feel that the "old" person has gone 
and they miss him/her. The next set of questions asks you to think about your 
relative as they were before the iniury . 
I think about this person so much that it's hard for me to do the things I 
normally do. 
never rarely sometimes often always 
Memories of the person I knew before the injury upset me 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I feel I cannot accept the loss of the person I knew before the injury 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I feel drawn to places and things associated with the person I knew before the 
injury 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I can't help feeling angry about the injury 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I feel disbelief over what happened 
never rarely sometimes often always 
Ever since the injury it is hard for me to trust people 
never rarely sometimes often always 
Ever since the injury I feel like I have lost the ability to care about other people 
or I feel distant from people I care about 
never rarely sometimes often always 
(aD 
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I have pain in the same area of my body or have some of the same symptoms as 
the injured person. 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I go out of my way to avoid reminders of the person I knew before the injury 
- never - rarely sometimes often always 
I feel that life is empty since this person was injured 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I hear the voice of the person I knew before the injury speak to me 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I see the person I knew before the injury stand before me 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I feel that it is unfair that I'm OK when this person is injured 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I feel bitter over this person's injury 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I feel envious of others who have not lost someone close 
never rarely sometimes often always 
I feel lonely a great deal of the time ever since he/she had their injury 
never rarely sometimes often always 
ý9 
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THE WIMBLEDON SELF-REPORT SCALE 
lE ............................................................ DATE......................... 
! words in cap ital letters below de scribe how p eople somet imes feel. Wi th each w ord there 
! four choices (a) , (b), (c) or (d) - that can be used to show how often you have had 
it feeling. P leas e indicate how of ten you have had each f eeling in the past 6-7 days by 
lerlng one of t hese choices each time. 
, WORTHLESS 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
, RELAXED 
(a) not at a ll (b) only o ccasionally (c) quite often (d) most of the time 
, DESPERATE 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
, PANICKY 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
-HELPLESS 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
GUILTY 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
CONFIDENT 
(a) not at a ll (b) only occasionally (c) quite often (d) most of the time 
" DISCOURAGED 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
-MISERABLE 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
LONELY 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
" IRRITABLE 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
GLOOMY 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
NERVOUS 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
ý" HAPPY 
(a) not at all (b) only occasionally (c) quite often (d) most of the timE 
ANNOYED 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
ý. UNWANTED 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often (c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
Please turn over 
IOv 
17. TENSE 
(a) most of the 
18. STUPID 
(a) most of the 
19. AS IF I AM BEIN 
(a) most of the 
20. IN GOOD SPIRITS 
time (b) quite often 
time (b) quite often 
G PUNISHED FOR SOMETHING 
time (b) quite often 
(c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
(c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
(c) only occasionally (d) not at all 
(a) not at all (b) only occasionally (c) quite often 
21. FULL OF REGRETS 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often 
22. FRIGHTENED 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often 
23. AS IF MY LIFE HAS BEEN RUINED 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often 
24. WORRIED ABOUT MY FUTURE 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often 
25. CHEERFUL 
(c) only occasionally 
(c) only occasionally 
(c) only occasionally 
(c) only occasionally 
(a) not at all (b) only occasionally (c) quite often 
2. USELESS 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often 
27. FED UP 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often 
28. HOPELESS 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often 
'9. ANGRY 
(a) most of the time (b) quite often 
. 30. CONTENT 
(c) only occasionally 
(c) only occasionally 
(c) only occasionally 
(c) only occasionally 
(a) not at all (b) only occasionally (c) quite often 
Please check you have answered all the questions. 
Thank you. 
(d) most of the t' 
(d) not at an 
(d) not at all 
(d) not at all 
(d) not at all 
(d) most of the 
(d) not at all 
(d) not at all 
td) not at all 
(d) not at all 
(d) most of the I 
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Hospital Anxiety and NFERýZ 
Depression Scale (HADS) 
Name: Date: 
Clinicians are aware that emotions play an important part in most illnesses. if your 
clinician knows about these feelings he or she will be able to help you more. 
0 
This questionnaire is designed to help your clinician to know how you feel. Read each 
item below and underline the reply which comes closest to how you have been feeling 
in the past week. Ignore the numbers printed at the edge of the questionnaire. 
your immediate reaction to each item will Don't take too long over your replies , 
probably be more-accurate than a long, thought-out response. 
A AD 
I feel tense or 'wound up' I feel as if I am slowed down 
Most of the time Nearly all the time 
A lot of the time very often 
From time to time, occasionally Sometimes 
10-11 Not at all Not at all 
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I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy 
Definitely as much 
Not quite so much 
Only a little 
Hardly at all 
I get a sort of frightened feeling as if 
something awful is about to happen 
Very definitely and quite badly 
Yes, but not too badly 
A little, but it doesn't worry me 
Not at all 
I can laugh and see the funny side of things 
As much as I always could 
Not quite so much now 
Definitely not so much now 
Not at all 
Worrying thoughts go through my mind 
A great deal of the time 
A lot of the time 
Not too often 
very little 
I feel cheerful 
Never 
Not often 
Sometimes 
Most of the time 
I can sit at ease and feel relaxed 
Definitely 
Usually 
Not often 
Not at all 
I get a sort of frightened feeling like 
`butterflies' in the stomach 
Not at all -07 
Occasionally Ti 
Quite often h . very often 1 -1 
I have lost interest in my appearance 
Definitely C3 
I don't take as much care as I should "C2' 
I may not take quite as much care 
I take just as much care as ever 
I feel restless as if I have to be on 
the move 
very much indeed 3 P :. 
Quite a lot i 
Not very much i 
Not at all Fo 
I look forward with enjoyment to things 
As much as I ever did 
Rather less than I used to 
Definitely less than I used to 
Hardly at all 
I get sudden feelings of panic 
Very often indeed (-3ý 
Quite often F271 
Not very often Ii 
Not at all ý' 
I can enjoy a good book or radio or 
television programme 
Often 
Sometimes 
Not often C 
Very seldom 13 
Now check that you have answered all the questions 
TOTAL 
This form is printed in green. Any other colour is an unauthorized photocopy. 
HADS copyright ©R. P. Snaith and AS. Zigmond. 1983,1992,1994. 
Record form items originally published in Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavfca 67,361-70, copyright ®Munksgaard International 
Publishers Ltd, Copenhagen. 1983. 
This edition first published in 1994 by The NFER-NELSON Publishing Company Ltd, Darville House. 2 Oxford Road East. 
Windsor, Berkshire SL4 IDF. UK. All rights reserved. 
Code 4460 01 4 Printed in Great Britain 1(6.94) 
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The following statements are things you could say about your family. Please rate how much you agree that 
each item describes your family by ticking one of the four alternative responses: strongly agree, agree. 
disagree, strongly disagree. 
strongly agree disagree'.. strongly 
agree : disagree 
I We usually act on our decisions 
regarding problems. 
2 When someone is upset the others know 
why. 
3 When you ask someone to do something, 
you have to check that they did it. 
4 We are reluctant to show our affection 
for each other. 
5 If someone is in trouble, the others 
become too involved. 
6 We don't know what to do when an 
emergency comes up. 
7 Planning family activities is difficult 
because we misunderstand each other. 
8 After our family tries to solve a problem, 
we usually discuss whether it worked or 
not. 
9 You can't tell how a person is feeling 
from what they are saying. 
10 We make sure members meet their family 
responsibilities. 
11 Some of us just don't respond 
emotionally. 
12 You only get the interest of others when 
someone is important to them. 
13 You can easily get away with breaking 
the rules. 
14 In times of crisis we can turn to each 
other for support. 
15 People come right out and say things 
instead of hinting at them. 
16 Family tasks don't get spread around 
enough. 
17 We do not show our love for each other. 
18 We are too self-centred. 
19 We k.,,... wiLL hat t LV do in d/n ergcnc.. "V LV YI Yº Lf 
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strongly 
agree 
agree disagree strongly 
disagree 
20 We cannot talk to each other about the 
sadness we feel. 
21 We have trouble meeting our bills. 
22 We get involved with each other only 
when something interests us. 
23 We have no clear expectations about 
toilet habits. 
24 Individuals are accepted for what they 
are. 
25 We resolve most emotional upsets that 
come up. 
26 We are frank with each other. 
27 There's little time to explore personal 
interests. 
28 Tenderness takes second place to other 
things in our family. 
29 We show interest in each other when we 
can get something out of it personally. 
30 We have rules about hitting people. 
31 We avoid discussing our fears and 
concerns. 
32 We discuss who is to do household jobs. 
33 We can express feelings to each other 
34 We confront problems involving feelings. 
35 We don't hold to any rules or standards. 
36 There are lots of bad feelings in the 
family. 
37 We express tenderness. 
38 We feel accepted for what we are. 
39 If the rules are broken, we don't know 
what to expect. 
40 We try to think of different ways to solve 
problems. 
41 We don't talk to each other when we are 
angry. 
42 If people are asked to do something, they 
need reminding. 
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strongly agree disagree strongly 
agree disagree 
43 Making decisions is a problem for our 
family. 
44 Anything goes in our family. 
45 Our family shows interest in each other 
only when they can get something out of 
it. 
46 We are generally dissatisfied with the 
family duties assigned to us. 
47 We are able to make decisions about how 
to solve problems. 
48 We cry openly. 
49 There are rules about dangerous 
situations. 
50 Even though we mean well, we intrude 
too much into each other's lives. 
51 We don't get along well together. 
52 When we don't like what someone has 
done, we tell them. 
53 We confide in each other. 
(10D A 
NEUROBEHAVIORAL RATING SCALE 
H. S. Levin, J. E. Overall. K. E. Goethe. W. High. R. A. Sisson 
ApO&Jrm kS AL. 
DIRECTIONS: Place an X in the appropriate box to represent I 
level of severity of each symptom. 
E 
M 
V_ 
PATIENT Sex M_F INITIAL GCS 
ID# Age Educ. (yrs) Coma Duration (days) 
Date -- 
/ -- 
/ 
-- 
Occup CT Findings (< 7 days postinjury) 
Date of injury 
Primary Hospital 
Rater 
Hypoxia: Y-N 
Shock. Y_N- 
1. INATTENTION/REDUCED ALERTNESS-fails to sustain atten- 
tion. easily distracted; fails to notice aspects of environment. 
difficulty directing attention, decreased alertness. 
2. SOMATIC CONCERN-volunteers complaints or elaborates about 
somatic symptoms (e. g.. headache. dizziness, blurred vision), and 
about physical health in general. 
3. DISORIENTATION-confusion or lack of proper association for 
person, place. or time. 
4. ANXIETY-worry, fear. overconcern for present or future. 
5. EXPRESSIVE DEFICIT-word-finding disturbance. anomia. 
pauses in speech, effortful and agrammatic speech, circumlocution. 
6. EMOTIONAL WITHDRAWAL-lack of spontaneous interaction, 
isolation, deficiency in relating to others. 
7. CONCEPTUAL DISORGANIZATION-thought processes 
confused. disconnected. disorganized. disrupted. tangential social 
communication perseverative. 
8. DISINHIBITION-socially inappropriate comments and/or actions. 
including aggressive/ sexual content. or inappropriate to the 
situation, outbursts of temper. 
9. GUILT FEELINGS-self-blame. shame, remorse for past behavior. 
10. MEMORY DEFICIT-difficulty learning new information, rapidly 
forgets recent events, although immediate recall (forward digit span) 
may be intact. 
11. AGITATION-motor manifestations of overactivation (e. g., kicking, 
arum flailing, picking, roaming, restlessness, talkativeness. ) 
12. INACCURATE INSIGHT AND SELF-APPRAISAL-poor insight, 
exaggerated self-opinion. overrates level of ability and underrates 
personality change in comparison with evaluation of clinicians and 
family. 
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13. DEPRESSIVE MOOD-sorrow, sadness, despondency, pessimism. 
14 HOS1ILI? Y UNCOOPERATIVENESS-animosity, irritability. 
belligerence. disdain for others, defiance of authority. 
15. DECREASED INITIATIVE/MOTIVATION -lacks normal initiative 
in work or leisure, fails to persist in tasks, is reluctant to accept new 
challenges. 
16. SUSPICIOUSNESS-mistrust, belief that others harbor malicious 
or discriminatory intent. 
17. FATIGABILITY-rapidly fatigues on challenging cognitive tasks or 
complex activities, lethargic. 
18. HALLUCINATORY BEHAVIOR-perceptions without normal ex- 
ternal stimulus correspondence. 
19. MOTOR RETARDATION-slowed movements or speech (excluding 
primary weakness). 
20. UNUSUAL THOUGHT'CONTENT-unusual, odd, strange, bizarre 
thought content. 
21. BLUNTED AFFECT-reduced emotional tone, reduction in normal 
intensity of feelings, flatness. 
22. EXCITEMENT-heightened emotional tone, increased reactivity. 
23. POOR PLANNING-unrealistic goals, poorly formulated plans for 
the future, disregards prerequisites (e. g.. training), fails to take 
disability into account. 
24. LABILITY OF MOOD-sudden change in mood whicl; is dispropor. 
tionate to the situation. 
25. TENSION-postural and facial expression of heightened tension, 
without the necessity of excessive activity involving the limbs or 
trunk. 
26. COMPREHENSION DEFICIT-difficulty in understanding oral 
instructions on single or multistage commands. 
27. SPEECH ARTICULATION DEFECT-misarticulation. slurring or 
substitution of sounds which affect intelligibility (rating is indepen- 
dent of linguistic content). - 
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